I've been reading David Frum and Richard Perle's An End to Evil. Bad title, and it doesn't try hard to convince people who don't share their worldview, but if you do you'll want to read it. One thing I realized while reading it was that I do share that worldview, or at least the idea it is built on. Not in the specifics. Everything written here can be argued over, and should be. The idea we have in common goes deeper than whether you think the US should risk war in Korea, or whether you think a mandatory national ID card would be a good move against terrorism. It's more basic than that: When I agree with them, I agree for the same reasons, and when I don't, I understand how they got there. And the reason is that they derive their views, and I derive mine, from a very similar idea.

We need a name for that idea. It's been brewing in hawkish blogs for two years, but it's not "hawkishness", which fits any aggressive foreign policy. It's historically associated with American neo-conservatism, but has support across the spectrum. I'm not a neo-conservative. I'm not sure what neo-conservatism is all about, and I wouldn't begin to guess what it would mean in a Norwegian context. And the idea I'm thinking of is not limited to any other narrowly defined ideology either. We fool ourselves if we try to tie it to one.

So what is this idea? A good place to start is a quote from their book:

National sovereignity is an obligation as well as an entitlement.

This struck me because I wrote something similar a few weeks ago, in a debate with someone who believes that the war on Iraq was wrong because it damaged the UN and international relations. Good relations between states and the integrity of the UN should have been Bush's first priority. He was also concerned about the belief that democracy can be spread by force. To install democracy in other countries for any other reason than strict self-defense would undermine the bedrock of international relations: Sovereignity.

My reply was that sovereignity has no moral value, only practical value. Few world leaders outside the West are more than sophisticated bandits. If you believe in sovereignity as a universal principle, what you're saying is that some bandits have a right to continue their banditry, as long as they do it under a flag and don't bother the other bandits. That's how the world must usually work, of course. Some of these bandits are very powerful. But just because it's usually necessary to respect sovereignity doesn't mean it's wrong to violate the sovereignity of a tyranny. It's often impractical and dangerous, but the morality of it depends on who's sovereignity your violating.

By invading Afghanistan and Iraq, and putting pressure on North Korea, Iran and similar regimes, Bush is sending the non-democratic regimes of the world a message. It's a message that undermines the traditional concept of sovereignity, but it is not a demand for total obedience. The message is something both the UN, Europe and the US has implied with words before, but rarely backed with force: That sovereignity carries obligations. One of those obligations is not to acquire nuclear weapons. Another is not to carry out genocides, or do anything else that is barbaric, like supporting terrorism.

And perhaps that is the central idea here, the one that divides one side from the other. Not so much that sovereignity carries obligations, which everyone agrees with in principle, but that it carries obligations and that the world should enforce those obligations. I may be wrong, but let me throw out a few thoughts here, and we'll see if they survive. At least we can do better than "neo-cons vs the UN".

On one side we have the people who believe that sovereignity is, well, the bedrock of international relations. We may not always like the regimes we deal with, and we can still encourage democratic change, but we must if possible do it through sovereignity, one head of state to another. Economic sanctions and harsh language do not violate anyone's sovereignity, they're international tools of diplomacy, and are thus acceptable. War and active "regime change" policies do violate sovereignity, and are unacceptably except as the very last resort. Beneath this respect for the principle of sovereignity lies a fear of the chaos we would have without it. That fear is justified. But there's also an idealization of sovereignity at work here: It's not just necessary to respect sovereignity, but morally right. This is partly a product of the diplomatic frame of mind. Frum and Perle writes:

Diplomats begin all their work with a fundamental institutional prejudice. It is their business to deal with foreign governments. The question "Should we be dealing with this government?" is simply alien to their whole professional outlook. Except in rare cases (apartheid South Africa, for example), our diplomats cannot help regarding all the world's governments, no matter how objectionable, as essentially legitimate.

Another angle: Sovereignity has been necessary for very long as an international stabilizer. The best way to convince others to respect your sovereignity is to profess a belief in the moral value of their sovereignity. At first this was largely a sham, but gradually everyone just found it easier to actually start believing in sovereignity, and not just pretend they did. Rhetorics bind you, and they also shape the climate your descendants grow up in. And so sovereignity goes from being necessary to being right. Necessity becomes morality. And this moral valuation of sovereignity is what defines the first group.

On the other side we have the people who believe not only that sovereignity carries obligations, but that these obligations should if possible be enforced. Respect for sovereignity is fine as the default mode, and sanctions are fine as the default weapons of diplomacy. They're also often the only practical weapons available. But when governments fail to live up to their obligations, when they abuse their citizens and rob them of their basic human rights, when they threaten the world in ways that don't involve armies marching across neighbouring borders, the principle of sovereignity must not stop us from intervening. Respect for sovereignity is a tool for a purpose, and if it doesn't work, or there are better tools available, we are not morally obligated to keep using it.

This is the belief that says that the US should have marched to Baghdad in 1991, (as neocons believed at the time), that the world should have stepped in in ex-Yugoslavia much sooner than it did, that it was acceptable to invade Iraq in 2003 even if it did not represent an imminent threat, and that it is right to work actively for regime change in places like Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and North-Korea. All these cases have different proportions of humanitarian and security concerns. What I believe they have in common is the role respect for sovereignity have played in the different policies towards them. The first group wondered why we must attack Iraq when we hadn't exhausted all other possible, sovereignity-respecting options, (and we hadn't). The other couldn't see why that mattered when Iraq was clearly evil and a potential threat.

What can we call these two groups? I believe it's a sidetrack to focus on any difference in goals. This is the problem with the term transnational progressivism, which implies a specific idea of how the world should look that many in the first group would agree with, and many in the other would not. I believe we can define these groups more accurately if we admit that they both have basically the same ideal in mind - worldwide liberal democracy. There are differences in the specifics, one version is more "European", and the other more "American". This reflects cross-Atlantic differences over what a liberal democracy should be like. Europe has a different social model, and different attitudes towards for instance the environment, as reflected in the Kyoto (dis-)agreement. But these differences are nothing to the difference between democracies and non-democracies. Both these groups believe the world would be a better place if all countries were open, democratic, peaceful and respected human rights, and by any standard that's quite a lot of common ground.

We should also remember that both groups are universalist. This applies even to the multiculturalists. There's much talk about the relativism of multiculturalism, the belief that "democracy is fine for us, but who are we to tell the Arabs what is best for them"? There's something to this. In practice, multiculturalism becomes cultural relativism. But it is also universalist. Multiculturalists envision a world where everyone tolerates everyone. The tolerance is supposed to be reciprocal, and the cultural differences we are supposed to tolerate are assumed to be so superficial that this won't be a problem. A multiculturalist may say that it's not our job to tell Arabs how to organize their societies, but if you ask such a multiculturalist whether a tolerant, democratic Iraq is better than an intolerant, tyrannic Iraq, they will say that it is. The goal is the same, the inconsistency lies in how to reach it. So even to the degree that the first group is multiculturalist, it remains universalist.

Both groups, then, are liberal democratic universalists. They agree about the important aspects of their goal. What they disagree about is the means. This follows largely from their beliefs about sovereignity. If sovereignity is the fundamental principle of world relations, then your goals must be reached through institutions that respect sovereignity, ie. international institutions. If sovereignity is just a practical necessity, then you may use methods that violate sovereignity, ie. intervention. Liberal internationalists and liberal interventionists. They disagree over much more than sovereignity, but I think we can trace much of it back to just that.

Ask me if I support the neo-conservative cabal in Washington, and I hesitate. It's a loaded term with an unclear definition. Ask me if I believe the West should intervene with dictatorships to promote liberal democracy more often, and I'll agree at once. The world is a horrible place. Some of that horror threatens us, some of it does not. The world rarely improves by itself, and any moral value of sovereignity should not prevent us from contributing to its improvement. This does not mean sending soldiers on reckless adventures to faraway countries. It means taking a clear stand against tyrants in a way that neither the US nor Europe have done very well in the past, tyrants like Milosevic and Saddam. It means not sacrificing the lives and wellbeing of millions for the sake of diplomatic stability. It means sending out a message, backed up by force: Sovereignity carries obligations. Whether the UN or the US sends that message is of less importance, as long as the threat of force is credible.

Opponents of this idea dismiss it as utopian idealism. Liberal interventionists are do-gooders who will sacrifice national security on a quest to save the world. Against this these opponents will offer realism, which places national security and stability over everything else. But the strength of liberal interventionism comes precisely from its combination of idealism and realism. Consider Iraq. If you've ever argued with a war opponent, you've probably found yourself emphasizing the moral aspect of invading Iraq one moment, and the security aspect the next. Saddam was evil, and he posed a threat. This may seem confusing. Which is it anyway, morality or security? Perhaps, as the peace movement claimed, arguments of morality were only used to cover the real motives, cynical self interest. Or perhaps, as others claimed, the security aspects were only used to rationalize the visions of dangerous idealists.

But I say both factors are at work. Intervening to promote liberal democratic values is both the right thing to do and a major contribution to our security. It is a distraction to ask which is the essential ingredient here, idealism or realism. How many of you would have supported the invasion of Iraq if Saddam had been a threat but not very evil, and how many if he had been evil but no much of a threat? Perhaps some, perhaps none. It's not very important. The power of this idea derives from the combined presence of moral and self-interested motives, from the knowledge of doing what is both useful and right. Like the chemical properties of water, far more powerful than its individual atoms, this combination of idealism and realism has powers its individual components do not.

We might even call it an explosive mix. And this is where we must remind ourselves to take caution. This idea is powerful. It's not inherently dangerous, unlike some explosive ideas we know of, but misapplied it will do much harm. The most obvious threat is ignorance. If I want to help you, but don't understand your needs or my abilities, I may do us both more harm than good. Ignorance has many parents. One of them is partisanship. If, like many American conservatives, you're unable to see anything good coming from a Democratic president, or anything bad from a Republican president, then you're on your way to ignorance. If you're unable to admit past mistakes, you're on your way to ignorance. If you have your views reinforced by intellectual feedback loops you're on your way to ignorance. An ignorant pacifist is not very dangerous, because pacifists never cause much to happen. An ignorant idealist with a gun is extremely dangerous. Even after Afghanistan, even after Iraq, this threat is important enough that we must remind ourselves of it regularly.

On a diet of skepticism and honesty, and on that only, liberal interventionism is the right tool both for the current war on terrorism and for the many wmd arms races, genocides and state implosions we'll see in the coming century.

I'm not willing to accept that Transnational Progressivism and Neo Conservatism have the same goal in mind, namely worldwide liberal democracy. They might use the same words, but both parties use them with a very different meaning.

Democracy: Fonte describes the redefinition of democracy and "democratic ideals" by Transnational Progressivists. This is a definition that is certainly not shared by Neo Cons. Calling it just a different form of democracy is too easy. Their views on democracy are World's apart. Myself, I'm not at all convinced that Transnational Progressivists truly promote democracy. I think that democracy could be the first thing out of the window if they have things their way.

Liberal: As you know there is "Berkeley Liberalism" and there is "European Liberalism". The first can be applied to Transnational Progressivism, the latter to Neo Conservatism. These two forms are almost ideological opposites, not just two different branches of liberalism that have sprouted from the same idea.

Worldwide: You are right that they are both globalists, but one is transnational and the other is international. Two different beasts all together.

Instead of describing what unites Transnational Progressivists and Neo-Cons you named the things that divides them most.

--Even after Afghanistan, even after Iraq, this threat is important enough that we must remind ourselves of it regularly.--

If it wasn't for Iraq, we wouldn't know the depth and sophistication of the nuke black market and why Pakland's moving up in the foodchain.

Terra: But who _are_ these TP's who would throw democracy out the window if they had their way? Where can I read their opinions of why democracy doesn't work? Where is their plan of conquest? The people I'm referring to are the people who believe in the UN, who have been writing page upon page in European newspapers about the virtues of international cooperation and the vice of unilateralism. (These people doesn't necessarily include individual heads of state in Europe. The French leadership may have had primarily selfish motives for opposing the US. But that doesn't mean their supporters had.) We know what they believe because they've told us. I don't recall seeing any proposals for throwing democracy out of the window. Perhaps that follows implicitly from some of their beliefs, but please show me where and how.

I pretty much agree with your idea of sovereignty, but violating it is not easy to defend. In the case of Saddam, he had started wars against at least two countries and threatened others, and after years of "sanctions" still threatened to invade others if sanctions were lifted (and support international terrorists even with sanctions): I think this is what made the country enough of a problem that a consortium or Coalition of countries finally concluded he must be removed from power. Bosnia, the Ivory Coast, Afghanistan, and Liberia were different circumstances.

Try doing a search of den Beste's site -
http://denbeste.nu/search.shtml
for Transnational or Tranzi, I think he has written several things explaining his view against it. Also search multi-cultural, I think he has pointed out instances where that stance is anti-democracy.

As to neo-con, I haven't been able to figure out what that means. Not sure I care, either. Here in the US it seems to be used to label (slur) almost anyone with whom the speaker disagrees and who is not a complete pacifist.

In the U.S. neo-con is definitely a slur, rather than a position. As best as I can figure out, a "neo-con" is a Jew influential in the Bush administration who believes that the Arab world needs to be actively pushed toward democracy (voters voting for their government). Neo-cons also may be hawkish, but that's because of Al-Quaeda and other Islamofacist and terrorist threats. The slur is the implied "Judaism," because people accused of being neo-cons are Jewish. A person with the same views, not Jewish, would probably not be called a "neo-con." The classic "neo-con" is Paul Wolfowitz, who is demonized mainly because his name sounds so dangerous. He is a very thoughtful man, whose goals are very humanistic and democratic.

Bjørn: Try Paul Treanor for starters. He's part of a intellectual movement which I would describe as TP. He might be a fringe, but he is consequent, very articulate, not bound by political correctness and gives therefor a good view of what TP really is all about.

His homepage: http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/

Don't miss the article 'Why democracy is wrong': http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/democracy.html

Or google. He's all over the place.

I also agree with a search on SDB's site. He warned many times of TP's undemocratic nature.

I would not at all be surprised if we're going to find TP elements melting together with Islamic fascism or with Islamic fundamentalism in the future. On a small scale we already saw that happening in Iraq. It does make sense, because I think that TP's have more in common with these ideologies than they do with NeoCons.

Here's a book review you might find interesting:

http://pages.prodigy.net/aesir/aete.htm

Would like to know whether you'd agree, or disagree, or whatever...

As for DenBeste on "Transnational Progressivism," here's a good place to begin (although he's written even more):

http://denbeste.nu/cd_log_entries/2002/08/Transnationalprogressivis.shtml

Taco: "Try Paul Treanor for starters. [..] He might be a fringe, but he is consequent, very articulate, not bound by political correctness and gives therefor a good view of what TP really is all about."

Perhaps _he_ is TP - I just don't believe everyone else is. That's what you need to show, that world leaders, internationalist thinkers and NGO's actually believe in these things. I don't think they do. They have a different concept of democracy, and it may be less democratic than what you and I believe in, but it's a long distance from that to claiming that they're _against_ democracy, that they're authoritarians.

"My emphasis then was on the need for the international community to unite in defence of universal human rights, making clear that sovereignty must never be a shield behind which states can commit gross and systematic abuses of human rights" Kofi Annan's speech at Tilburg University (2002)

"sovereignity has no moral value, only practical value. Few world leaders outside the West are more than sophisticated bandits." I think Mr. Annan would agree with you more so than you interlocutor.

My emphasis then was on the need for the international community to unite in defence of universal human rights, making clear that sovereignty must never be a shield behind which states can commit gross and systematic abuses of human rights" Kofi Annan's speech at Tilburg University (2002)

"sovereignity has no moral value, only practical value. Few world leaders outside the West are more than sophisticated bandits." I think Mr. Annan would agree with you more so than you interlocutor.

Nicholas: But everyone _claims_ to believe that sovereignity carries obligations. They just don't want to enforce those obligations. I believe Kofi Annan had some experiences with Rwanda confirming just that.

Hi Bjørn.
An interesting post. I'll consider chekcing out that Frum/Perle book. I just thought I'd clarify my positions as quoted by you.

"The war on Iraq was wrong because it damaged the UN and international relations."
Yes. But the main reason for war was WMD, and as Kay has said "We were all wrong". Fareed Zakaria editor of Newsweek retorts: NO...The UN Inspectors were in fact right when they said it was unlikely with 500 tons of WMD" (500 tons was used by Bush in State of the Union 2003) There were no stockpiles and that is also a BIG reason for why this war was "sold" and fought for the wrong reasons/justifications.

"Good relations between states and the integrity of the UN should have been Bush's first priority."
No. The security of the American people should be Bush's first priority. There was no imminent/real/ threat to American security posed by Iraq. Consequently, he could have tried to pursue other interests...if he has any.

So there is no other reason to go to war than the marvellous idea of imposing democracy with B52s and Marines. And that is no casus belli. I am indeed
"concerned about the belief that democracy can be spread by force."

There is no way to claim that other means were exhausted and that war was the last resort in Iraq. No way. It was a chosen aggressive war for idealistic reasons at best.

Btw, I think that you should not exclude the possibility that Orwell's work can be interpreted in many ways. I don't know who's the butcherer on that one. We disagree about the meaning of Orwell's headline: "Meaningless words".

An interesting read! I'll consider what you said over my christmas holidays. I want Office 2003 Standard great for Student & Teacher Edition 2003 for Christmas!

An interesting read! I'll consider what you said over my christmas holidays. I want The Sims 2 for Christmas!

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