% FROM THE NOAM CHOMSKY ARCHIVE
% http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:/usr/tp0x/chomsky.html
% ftp://ftp.cs.cmu.edu/user/cap/chomsky/
% Filename:    articles/chomsky.faurisson-avis
% Title:       Some Elementary Comments on the Rights of Freedom of Expression
% Author:      Noam Chomsky
% Appeared-in: as an _avis_ to Faurisson's _Memoire en defense_
% Source:      transcribed by Don Bashford 
% Keywords:    freedom of speech, Faurisson
% Synopsis:    
% See-also:    articles/chomsky.nation.his-right-to-say-it, reviews/hitchens.chorus-and-cassandra

 SOME ELEMENTARY COMMENTS ON THE RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
			  Noam Chomsky


The remarks that follow are sufficiently banal so that I feel
that an apology is in order to reasonable people who may happen
to read them.  If there is, nevertheless, good reason to put them
on paper---and I fear that there is---this testifies to some
remarkable features of contemporary French intellectual culture.

Before I turn to the subject on which I have been asked to
comment, two clarifications are necessary.  The remarks that
follow are limited in two crucial respects.  First: I am
concerned here solely with a narrow and specific topic, namely,
the right of free expression of ideas, conclusions and beliefs.
I have nothing to say here about the work of Robert Faurisson or
his critics, of which I know very little, or about the topics
they address, concerning which I have no special knowledge.
Second: I will have some harsh (but merited) things to say about
certain segments of the French intelligentsia, who have
demonstrated that they have not the slightest concern for fact or
reason, as I have learned from unpleasant personal experience
that I will not review here.  Certainly, what I say does not
apply to many others, who maintain a firm commitment to
intellectual integrity.  This is not the place for a detailed
account.  The tendencies to which I refer are, I believe,
sufficiently significant to merit attention and concern, but I
would not want these comments to be misunderstood as applying
beyond their specific scope.

Some time ago I was asked to sign a petition in defense of Robert
Faurisson's ``freedom of speech and expression.''  The petition
said absolutely nothing about the character, quality or validity
of his research, but restricted itself quite explicitly to a
defense of elementary rights that are taken for granted in
democratic societies, calling upon university and government
officials to ``do everything possible to ensure the [Faurisson's]
safety and the free exercise of his legal rights.''  I signed it
without hesitation.

The fact that I had signed the petition aroused a storm of
protest in France.  In the _Nouvel Observateur_, an ex-Stalinist
who has changed allegiance but not intellectual style published a
grossly falsified version of the contents of the petition, amidst
a stream of falsehoods that merit no comment.  This, however, I
have come to regard as normal.  I was considerably more surprised
to read in _Esprit_ (September 1980) that Pierre Vidal-Naquet
found the petition ``scandaleuse,'' citing specifically that fact
that I had signed it (I omit the discussion of an accompanying
article by the editor that again merits no comment, at least
among people who retain a commitment to elementary values of
truth and honesty).

Vidal-Naquet offers exactly one reason for finding the petition,
and my act of signing it, ``scandaleuse'': the petition, he
claims, presented Faurisson's ``'conclusions' comme si elles
etaient effectivement des decouvertes.''  Vidal-Naquet's
statement is false.  The petition simply stated that Faurisson
had presented his ``finding,'' which is uncontroversial, stating
or implying precisely nothing about their value and implying
nothing about their validity.  Perhaps Vidal-Naquet was misled by
faulty understanding of the English wording of the petition; that
is, perhaps he misunderstood the English word ``findings.''  It
is, of course, obvious that if I say that someone presented his
``findings'' I imply nothing whatsoever about their character or
validity; the statement is perfectly neutral in this respect.  I
assume that it was indeed a simple misunderstanding of the text
that led Vidal-Naquet to write what he did, in which case he
will, of course, publicly withdraw that accusation that I (among
others) have done something ``scandaleuse'' in signing an
innocuous civil rights petition of the sort that all of us sign
frequently.

I do not want to discuss individuals.  Suppose, then, that some
person does indeed find the petition ``scandaleuse,'' not on the
basis of misreading, but because of what it actually says.  Let
us suppose that this person finds Faurisson's ideas offensive,
even horrendous, and finds his scholarship to be a scandal.  Let
us suppose further that he is correct in these conclusions---
whether he is or not is plainly irrelevant in this context.  Then
we must conclude that the person in question believes that the
petition was ``scandaleuse'' because Faurisson should indeed be
denied the normal rights of self-expression, should be barred
from the university, should be subjected to harassment and even
violence, etc.  Such attitudes are not uncommon.  They are
typical, for example of American Communists and no doubt their
counterparts elsewhere.  Among people who have learned something
from the 18th century (say, Voltaire) it is a truism, hardly
deserving discussion, that the defense of the right of free
expression is not restricted to ideas one approves of, and that
it is precisely in the case of ideas found most offensive that
these rights must be most vigorously defended.  Advocacy of the
right to express ideas that are generally approved is, quite
obviously, a matter of no significance.  All of this is
well-understood in the United States, which is why there has been
nothing like the Faurisson affair here.  In France, where a civil
libertarian tradition is evidently not well-established and where
there have been deep totalitarian strains among the
intelligentsia for many years (collaborationism, the great
influence of Leninism and its offshoots, the near-lunatic
character of the new intellectual right, etc.), matters are
apparently quite different.

For those who are concerned with the state of French intellectual
culture, the Faurisson affair is not without interest.  Two
comparisons immediately come to mind.  The first is this.  I have
frequently signed petitions---indeed, gone to far greater
lengths---on behalf of Russian dissidents whose views are
absolutely horrendous: advocates of ongoing U.S. savagery in
Indochina, or of policies that would lead to nuclear war, or of a
religious chauvinism that is reminiscent of the dark ages.  No
one has ever raised an objection.  Should someone have done so, I
would regard this with the same contempt as is deserved by the
behavior of those who denounce the petition in support of
Faurisson's civil rights, and for exactly the same reason.  I do
not read the Communist Party press, but I have little doubt that
the commissars and apparatchiks have carefully perused these
petitions, seeking out phrases that could be maliciously
misinterpreted, in an effort to discredit these efforts to
prevent the suppression of human rights.  In comparison, when I
state that irrespective of his views, Faurisson's civil rights
should be guaranteed, this is taken to be ``scandaleuse'' and a
great fuss is made about it in France.  The reason for the
distinction seems obvious enough.  In the case of the Russian
dissidents, the state (our states) approves of supporting them,
for its own reasons, which have little to do with concern for
human rights, needless to say.  In the case of Faurisson,
however, defense of his civil rights is not officially approved
doctrine---far from it---so that segments of the intelligentsia,
who are ever eager to line up and march off to the beat of the
drums, do not perceive any need to take the stance accepted
without question in the case of Soviet dissidents.  In France,
there may well be other factors: perhaps a lingering guilt about
disgraceful behavior of substantial sectors under Vichy, the
failure to protest the French wars in Indochina, that lasting
impact of Stalinism and more generally Leninist doctrines, the
bizarre and dadaistic character of certain streams of
intellectual life in postwar France which makes rational
discourse appear to be such an odd and unintelligible pastime,
the currents of anti-Semitism that have exploded into violence.

A second comparison also comes to mind.  I rarely have much good
to say about the mainstream intelligentsia in the United States,
who generally resemble their counterparts elsewhere.  Still, it
is very illuminating to compare the reaction to the Faurisson
affair in France and to the same phenomenon here.  In the United
States, Arthur Butz (whom one might regard as the American
Faurisson) has not been subjected to the kind of merciless attack
levelled against Faurisson.  When the ``no holocaust'' historians
hold a large international meeting in the United States, as they
did some months ago, there is nothing like the hysteria that we
find in France over the Faurisson affair.  When the American Nazi
Party calls for a parade in the largely Jewish city of Skokie,
Illinois---obviously, pure provocation---the American Civil
Liberties Union defends their rights (though of course, the
American Communist Party is infuriated).  As far as I am aware,
much the same is true in England or Australia, countries which,
like the United States, have a live civil libertarian tradition.
Butz and the rest are sharply criticized and condemned, but
without any attack on their civil rights, to my knowledge.  There
is no need, in these countries, for an innocuous petition such as
the one that is found ``scandaleuse'' in France, and if there
were such a petition, it would surely not be attacked outside of
limited and insignificant circles.  The comparison is, again,
illuminating.  One should try to understand it.  One might argue,
perhaps, that Nazism and anti-Semitism are much more threatening
in France.  I think that this is true, but it is simply a
reflection of the same factors that led to the Leninism of
substantial sectors of the French intelligentsia for a long
period, their contempt for elementary civil libertarian
principles today, and their current fanaticism in beating the
drums for crusades against the Third World.  There are, in short,
deep-seated totalitarian strains that emerge in various guises, a
matter well worth further consideration, I believe.

Let me add a final remark about Faurisson's alleged ``anti-Semitism.''
Note first that even if Faurisson were to be a rabid anti-Semite
and fanatic pro-Nazi---such charges have been presented to me in
private correspondence that it would be improper to cite in
detail here---this would have no bearing whatsoever on the
legitimacy of the defense of his civil rights.  On the contrary,
it would make it all the more imperative to defend them since,
once again, it has been a truism for years, indeed centuries,
that it is precisely in the case of horrendous ideas that the
right of free expression must be most vigorously defended; it is
easy enough to defend free expression for those who require no
such defense.  Putting this central issue aside, is it true that
Faurisson is an anti-Semite or a neo-Nazi?  As noted earlier, I
do not know his work very well.  But from what I have
read---largely as a result of the nature of the attacks on
him---I find no evidence to support either conclusion.  Nor do I
find credible evidence in the material that I have read
concerning him, either in the public record or in private
correspondence.  As far as I can determine, he is a relatively
apolitical liberal of some sort.  In support of the charge of
anti-Semitism, I have been informed that Faurisson is remembered
by some schoolmates as having expressed anti-Semitic sentiments
in the 1940s, and as having written a letter that some interpret
as having anti-Semitic implications at the time of the Algerian
war.  I am a little surprised that serious people should put such
charges forth--- even in private---as a sufficient basis for
castigating someone as a long-time and well-known anti-Semitic.
I am aware of nothing in the public record to support such
charges.  I will not pursue the exercise, but suppose we were to
apply similar standards to others, asking, for example, what
their attitude was towards the French war in Indochina, or to
Stalinism, decades ago.  Perhaps no more need be said.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
October 11, 1980