% FROM THE NOAM CHOMSKY ARCHIVE
% http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:/usr/tp0x/chomsky.html
% ftp://ftp.cs.cmu.edu/user/cap/chomsky/
% Filename:    articles/chomsky.loot.gulf-embargo
% Title:       Letter from Lexington (column)
% Author:      Noam Chomsky
% Appeared-in: Lies Of Our Times (LOOT), September 1991
% Source:      aritza@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
% Keywords:    
% Synopsis:    US props up Saddam and punishes Iraqis after Gulf War
% See-also:    

Letter from Lexington

August 12, 1991

Dear LOOT,

Honest journalism is a demanding craft, but the respectable
variety, a very different genre, has its burdens as well. The
aftermath of the Gulf war provides many illustrations. Here is a
small sample.

One essential talent is a tolerance for contradiction. Thus
Patrick Tyler observes that ``gaps remain in the Administration's
goal of stemming the Middle East arms race, even as Washington
has become the dominant arms supplier in the region'' (July 28,
1991, p. A12). Here we see the familiar conflict between facts
and Truth, facts being what happens in the world, while Truth has
a more august status, emanating from power itself. That the
Administration's goal is to stem the Middle East arms race is
Truth, established by assertion from on high. Washington's
exploitation of the opportunity to sell high tech weapons is mere
fact, too insignificant to undermine Truth.

Washington's inspiring benevolence is another Truth that totters
uneasily alongside recalcitrant fact. Confronting the problem
head on, Tyler writes: ``Though Mr. Bush has made it plain that
he will not tolerate needless suffering among Iraqi women and
children, widespread disease and malnutrition have been
documented in the country, but have not yet been addressed.'' The
last phrase is a euphemism. The translation into English reads:
``but the U.S. and its British puppy dog are blocking efforts to
deal with the civilian catastrophe.''

The contradiction between fact and Truth would be overcome if Mr.
Bush were just unaware of the vast and growing civilian
suffering. Pursuing that heroic option, Tyler reports that the
embargo is ``hurting the Iraqi people far more than is perceived
in Washington'' (_NYT_, June 24, 1991, p. A1). True, ``severe
malnutrition and spiraling disease'' may have a ``devastating
effect on the civilian population,'' but Mr. Bush hasn't been
told. The dilemma is now resolved: when he learns about the
effects of his sanctions, he will move resolutely to help ``Iraqi
women and children,'' in accord with the principles that he has
``made plain.''

The astute reader will have noticed that the contradiction can be
overcome in a different way. It is only _needless_ suffering that
Our Leader will not tolerate. Utilitarian suffering is quite
another thing. In the case in question, the suffering serves a
useful function: to hold the population hostage for political
ends (what is called ``terrorism'' when done on a far lesser
scale by some official enemy). The suffering is therefore
justified on realistic, pragmatic grounds.

The reasoning is explained by _Times_ chief diplomatic
correspondent Thomas Friedman: Iraqi generals will be induced to
topple Mr. Hussein, ``and then Washington would have the best of
all worlds: an iron-fisted Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein.''
In short, by punishing Iraqi women and children, Washington will
be able to restore the happy days when Saddam's ``iron fist . . .
held Iraq together, much to the satisfaction of the American
allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia,'' not to speak of the boss in
Washington, who had no problem with the means employed (_NYT_,
July 7, 1991, ``News of the Week in Review'', p. 1).

It wil be quite proper, then, to ``have sat by and watched a
country starve for political reasons'' (UNICEF's director of
public affairs Richard Reid.) That is what will happen, Reid
predicts, unless Iraq is permitted to purchase ``massive
quantities of food''---though it is already far too late for the
children under two, who have stopped growing for six or seven
months because of severe malnutrition, he reports (Kathy Blair,
_Toronto Globe & Mail_, June 17, 1991, p. A1). It is also too
late for the 55,000 children who had died by May (Patrick Tyler,
_NYT_, May 22, 1991, reporting the Harvard medical team study
that predicted another 170,000 child deaths by the end of the
year), and for countless others in a country facing ``widespread
starvation,'' a critical shortage of drugs and a collapsing
medical system, quadrupling of diarrhoeal diseases, outbreaks of
typhoid and cholera in cities with raw sewage flowing in streets
and into rivers, and the other forms of utilitarian suffering
reported by the recent UN Secretary-General's mission (_Guardian
Weekly_ (London), Aug. 4, 1991, p. 9).

If we are lucky, Bush's ex-pal may lend a helpful hand. The _Wall
Street Journal_ observes that Iraq's ``clumsy attempt to hide
nuclear-bomb-making equipment from the U.N. may be a blessing in
disguise, U.S. officials say. It assures that the allies [read:
U.S. and U.K.] can keep economic sanctions in place to squeeze
Saddam Hussein without mounting calls to end the penalties for
humanitarian reasons'' (_WSJ_, July 5, 1991, p.  1). No annoying
noises, then, from the P.C. crowd as we cheerfully ``watch the
country starve for political reasons.''

The Bush-_Times_ conception of ``the best of all worlds'' is not
universally shared. London banker Ahmad Chalabi, a spokesman for
the Iraqi democratic opposition, describes the outcome of the war
as ``the worst of all possible worlds'' for the Iraqi people
(_Wall Street Journal_, April 8, 1991). This apparently
contradiction is also readily resolved. The worst of all possible
worlds for the Iraqi people may well be the best of all worlds
from the perspective of offices in Washington and New York.
Right-thinking people may agree with Chalabi that ``the tragedy
in Iraq is awesome,'' meanwhile recognizing that the important
concerns are those spelled out by the State Department spokesman
at the _Times_. ``Before Mr. Hussein invaded Kuwait,'' Friedman
writes, ``he was a pillar of the gulf balance of power and status
quo preferred by Washington,'' employing his ``iron fist'' with
our approval and generous assistance. He made a false move on
August 2, 1990, ``but as soon as Mr. Hussein was forced back into
his shell, Washington felt he had become useful again . . . That
is why Mr. Bush never supported the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions
against Mr. Hussein, or for that matter any democracy movement in
Iraq'' (_op. cit._).

That is also why the _Times_---in fact, the media generally---
have scrupulously avoided the Iraqi democratic forces (though the
_Wall Street Journal_ deserves credit for allowing them a few
openings well after the splendid triumph). These silly folk had
the bad taste to oppose Washington's plans throughout; much like
the Palestinians, they fail to recognize ``the hard realities of
the region'' (Serge Schmemann, _NYT_, Aug. 3, 1991, p. A1), and
thus deserve their fate. They were calling for democracy in Iraq
when Saddam's ``iron fist'' was providing Washington with ``the
best of all worlds.'' They opposed the ruinous U.S.-U.K. war and
urged pursuit of the diplomatic track that was barred by
Washington and virtually suppressed by the media. And finally,
compounding their sins, they are again calling for democracy in
Iraq while Washington seeks to install some clone of Saddam
Hussein, but one who understands that ``what we say goes,'' in
the President's fine words.

Speaking abroad, Chalabi observed in mid-March that Washington
``is waiting for Saddam to butcher the insurgents in the hope
that he can be overthrown later by a suitable officer,'' an
attitude rooted in the US policy of ``supporting dictatorships to
maintain stability.'' The Bush administration announced that it
would continue to refuse any contact with Iraqi democratic
leaders: ``We felt that political meetings with them . . . would
not be appropriate for our policy at this time,'' State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated on March 14 (_Mideast
Mirror_ (London), March 15, 1991). The Department is true to its
word. Alan Cowell reports that Iraqi exiles in Syria say ``there
has been no reply'' to their letter requesting a meeting with
James Baker, ``and the embassy's doors remain closed to them,''
as in Washington, London, and elsewhere (_NYT_, April 11, 1991,
A11).

The traditional U.S. opposition to democratic forces poses a
constant challenge for the vigilant defenders of Truth. In the
present case, the respectable commentator must play down the U.S.
military tactics: to create maximum long-lasting damage to the
civilian society for the political end of restoring the ``iron
fist''; and to massacre defenseless conscripts (mostly Shi'ite
and Kurdish peasants, apparently) hiding in holes in the sand or
fleeing for their lives while elite units were released to do
their necessary work and U.S. forces were spared any danger of
combat. Reporting from northern Iraq, American correspondent
Charles Glass described how journalists watched as ``Republican
Guards, supported by regular army brigades, mercilessly shelled
Kurdish-held areas with Katyusha multiple rocket launchers,
helicopter gunships and heavy artillery,'' while they tuned in to
listen to Stormin' Norman puffing on about how ``We had destroyed
the Republican Guard as a militarily effective force'' and
eliminated the military use of helicopters (_Spectator_, London,
April 13, 1991)---not the stuff of which heroes are manufactured,
therefore finessed, though the story could not be totally ignored
at home.

Striving manfully to reconcile fact with Truth, _Times_ Middle
East correspondent Alan Cowell attributes the failure of the
rebels to the fact that ``very few people outside Iraq wanted
them to win.'' Here the concept ``people'' has its standard
meaning in respectable journalism: ``people who count.'' The
``allied campaign against President Hussein brought the United
States and its Arab coalition partners to a strikingly unanimous
view,'' Cowell continues: ``whatever the sins of the Iraqi
leader, he offered the West and the region a better hope for his
country's stability than did those who have suffered his
repression'' (_op. cit._).

These ``Arab coalition partners'' are a merry crew: six family
dictatorships, Syria's Hafez el-Assad (indistinguishable from
President Hussein), and Egypt, the sole Arab ally with a degree
of internal freedom. We therefore look to the semi-official press
in Egypt to verify Cowell's report of the ``strikingly unanimous
view.'' His article is datelined Damascus, April 10.  The day
before, Deputy Editor Salaheddin Hafez of Egypt's leading daily,
_al-Ahram_, commented on Saddam's demolition of the rebels
``under the umbrella of the Western alliance's forces.'' The U.S.
stance proved what Egypt had been saying all along, Hafez wrote.
American rhetoric about ``the savage beast, Saddam Hussein,'' was
merely a cover for the true goals: to cut Iraq down to size and
establish US hegemony in the region. The West turned out to be in
total agreement with the beast on the need to ``block any
progress and abort all hopes, however dim, for freedom or
equality and for progress towards democracy,'' working in
``collusion with Saddam himself'' if necessary (_al-Ahram_, April
9, 1991; quoted in _Mideast Mirror_ (London), April 10).

There was, indeed, some regional support for the U.S. stance. In
Israel, many commentators (including leading doves) agreed with
retiring Chief-of-Staff Dan Shomron that it is preferable for
Saddam Hussein to remain in power in Iraq (Ron Ben-Yishai,
interview with Shomron, _Ha'aretz_, March 29; Shalom Yerushalmi,
``We are all with Saddam,'' _Kol Ha'ir_, April 4, 1991). Others
welcomed the suppression of the Kurds because of ``the latent
ambition of Iran and Syria to exploit the Kurds and create a
territorial, military, contiguity between Teheran and
Damascus---a contiguity which embodies danger for Israel'' (Moshe
Zak, senior editor of _Ma'ariv_, _Jerusalem Post_. April 4,
1991). But all this was unhelpful, therefore suppressed.

Another task is to show that despite the outcome, it was indeed a
Grand Victory. Tacit U.S. support for the slaughter of the Kurds
posed some difficulties, which would have been even more severe
had the media deigned to report the testimony of Western doctors
and other observers on Turkish bombing of hundreds of Kurdish
villages and the hundreds of thousands of Kurds in flight, trying
to survive the cold winter while aid was barred by the government
and Mr. Bush hailed the Turkish leader Turgut Ozal as ``a
protector of peace,'' joining those who ``stand up for civilized
values around the world.'' But the tragedy of the Shi'ites, who
appear to have suffered much worse destruction and terror under
the gaze of the heroic Schwartzkopf, was readily put to the side;
they are, after all, mere Arabs.

This task too was accomplished. In its anniversary editorial, the
_Times_ editors dismissed the qualms of ``the doubters,''
concluding that Mr. Bush had acted wisely: he ``avoided the
quagmire and preserved his two triumphs: the extraordinary
cooperation among coalition members and the revived
self-confidence of Americans,'' who ``greeted the Feb. 28
cease-fire with relief and pride---relief at miraculously few
U.S. casualties and pride in the brilliant performance of the
allied forces'' (_NYT_, Aug. 2, 1991). Surely these ``triumphs''
far outweigh the ``awesome tragedies'' in the region.

One can appreciate the mood of the nonpeople of the world, rarely
reported here. It is captured by Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns of
Sao Paolo, Brazil, who writes that in the Arab countries ``the
rich sided with the U.S. government while the _millions_ of poor
condemned this military aggression,'' and throughout the Third
World, ``there is hatred and fear: When will they decide to
invade us,'' and on what pretext?

Sincerely,

Noam Chomsky