% FROM THE NOAM CHOMSKY ARCHIVE
% http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:/usr/tp0x/chomsky.html
% ftp://ftp.cs.cmu.edu/user/cap/chomsky/
% Filename: articles/chomsky.z.gulf-war-pullout
% Title: Gulf War Pullout
% Author: Noam Chomsky and Michael Albert
% Appeared-in: Z Magazine, February 1991
% Source: ACTIV-L listserver file GULF-WAR ANALYSIS
% Keywords: Iraq, Kuwait, Bush, Saddam
% Synopsis: Summary of Michael Albert and Noam Chomsky articles
% See-also: articles/chomsky.z.gulf-crisis
GULF WAR PULLOUT
Noam Chomsky and Michael Albert
Z Magazine, February 1991
The ``Logic'' of War
To effectively combat war in the Gulf we have to understand its
motives. Bush is seeking to get Iraq out of Kuwait. Possibly he
is seeking to reduce Iraq to rubble. But that is not the whole
story.
Hundreds of U.S. bombers are not ``storming'' Iraq to maintain
cheap oil (1) The cost of more expensive oil would be much less
than the cost of the military operation. (2) Oil prices have a
marked-regulated cap anyhow. If oil producers raise prices too
high for too long, users drift away which is self-defeating for
oil rich countries. (3) Insofar as high oil prices cause problems
to industrialized economies, Europe and Japan are more vulnerable
than the U.S., so relative to these countries higher oil prices
often _help_ our economy at a time of its threatened dissolution.
Fleets of U.S. helicopters are not ``storming'' Iraq to honor
Kuwait's national sovereignty. U.S. history is a near continuous
chronicle of violating other countries' national sovereignty for
even less compelling reasons than those Saddam Hussein offers to
rationalize his militarism. For example, Kuwait's oil policies
were certainly more damaging to Iraq's economy than Panama's
policies were to the U.S. economy. No U.S. elected official or
mainstream media commentator has even hinted that our invasion of
Panama was just as much a violation of national sovereignty as
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Respect for national sovereignty is
an after-the-fact rationalization of Desert Storm, not a motive.
U.S. troops are not ``storming'' Iraq because we fear Hitlerite
expansionism. Iraq is only a local power, not pre-World War II
Germany. Iraq just spent the 1980s _failing_ to conquer Iran
despite U.S. support.
The real reason for U.S. opposition to Iraqi occupation of Kuwait
is not to keep oil prices low, but to keep Washington, Wall
Street, and their allies in charge of setting oil prices. We are
fighting to maintain and even enlarge one of our few continuing
claims to international economic clout: control of oil prices.
The Bush administration and the _New York Times_ alike view the
Mideast as an extension of Texas. It is ``our oil,'' not theirs.
The U.S. oil posture is not a sober defense of countries
dependent on oil. It is a greedy offensive that pursues U.S. oil
advantage. Most countries, particularly Third World countries,
suffer horribly for these policies.
But fulfilling our imperial need to control the ``oil card''
requires only that Hussein be pushed out of Kuwait. A second
question therefore arises. Why not let diplomacy and sanctions
push Hussein out? Why escalate the war?
The answer is at the heart of understanding the U.S. role in the
so-called ``new world order.'' George Bush wants Hussein out of
Kuwait, yes. But he does not want UN activism, international
sanctions, and multilateral diplomacy credited with causing
withdrawal. From Bush's perspective a diplomatic solution would
be as bad as Hussein's interference in the first place.
Diplomatic success would undercut the efficacy of U.S. military
interventionism, now, and well into the future. And it would add
powerful fuel to calls for a ``peace dividend'' and conversion
here in the U.S..
On the other hand, the early dispatch of hundreds of thousands of
U.S. troops and immense firepower allowed Bush to enter what he
undoubtedly saw as a ``win/win'' game. If Hussein had withdrawn
Bush would have claimed he did so due to our military threat,
thus establishing the logic of continued military spending to
maintain peace. Now, the U.S. will forcibly annihilate Hussein,
again evidencing the necessity for military might. The goal of
our drive to war is to maintain the region's effective
colonization _while re-legitimating militarism_. Now Secretary of
Defense Cheney will argue not only for increased conventional
military expenditures, but also for nuclear and star wars
expenditures to forestall future Third World conflicts and/or
smash future dictators who stray from doing our bidding. Desert
Storm is, therefore, also a war against the redistribution of
domestic wealth and power than conversion away from militarism
implies. It is a war against Iraq, but also a war against the
poor in our own country.
For years the U.S. has been the biggest economic power and has
shared contested military dominance with the Soviet Union. Now we
are alone at the top of the military heap with the biggest, best,
and most numerous weapons of every conceivable type. Moreover,
our economy is losing its ability to coerce international
obedience. The U.S. is climbing down the ladder of economic
influence as U.S. military stature rises without limit. Big guns
and fewer dollars suggest a warfare state hiring out as the
world's enforcer. Now we fight Exxon's wars _and_ anyone else's,
as long as they pay the proper fees, either because they want to
or, if necessary, because we force them to. Have gun will travel.
Destination: a warrior state domestically and internationally.
The first battle over this scenario is unfolding now in the
Mideast, as well as here at home. Will militarism be re-
legitimated or will conversion gain momentum as a policy
alternative? To reverse Bush's war scenario social movements must
explain the underlying forces compelling Bush's violence and
galvanize the deep-rooted and sustained opposition needed to stop
it.
Questions and Answers
1. Does the U.S. oppose aggression? No.
. Aggression is fine if it's in U.S. interests. It's bad only if
it's opposed to U.S. interests. The U.S. invaded Panama and
imposed a puppet regime still under U.S. control. The world
objected so we vetoed two UN Security Council resolutions.
. Turkey invaded northern Cyprus, broke it up, killed two
thousand people, tried to destroy relics of Greek civilization,
drove out 200,000 people. That was fine. Turkey is our ally.
. Israel attacked Lebanon, killed about 20,000 people, bombarded
the capital, and still occupies southern Lebanon. The U.S.
vetoed a series of UN Security Council resolutions to terminate
that aggression. Israel holds on to the occupied territories.
It has annexed some of them. Fine. The U.S. supports Israel.
. Morocco invaded the Western Sahara, annexed it. The U.S.
thinks that's fine.
. Indonesia invaded East Timor. Two hundred thousand killed.
The worst slaughter relative to the population since the
Holocaust. The U.S. gives them aid.
. Iraq attacked Iran. The U.S. assisted them. Iraq gassed the
Kurds in the north of Iraq. Fine. After all, the Turks are
having problems with the Kurds too and the Turks are our ally.
. Iraq invades Kuwait. Outrage. Cries of Hitler reborn. Send
400,000 troops. Bomb Baghdad.
. The United States can claim it's opposed to aggression on ABC
News without ridicule because we have a disciplined
intellectual class who look the other way and/or lie as a
matter of course. In the Third World, however, the claim is
seen as ludicrous. People there consider the U.S. the major
violator of the principle that aggression is wrong.
2. Does the U.S. oppose proliferation of super-weapons? No.
. In April 1990, Saddam Hussein, then still the U.S.'s friend and
ally, offered to destroy his chemical and biological weapons if
Israel agreed to destroy its non-conventional weapons---
including its nuclear weapons. The State Department welcomed
Hussein's offer to destroy his own arsenal, but rejected the
link ``to other issues or weapons systems.''
. Acknowledgment of the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons
would raise the question why all U.S. aid to Israel is not
illegal under 1970s congressional legislation that bars aid to
any country engaged in clandestine nuclear weapons development.
. In December 1990, speaking at a joint press conference with
Secretary of State Baker, then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze proposed a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East if
Iraq withdraws form Kuwait. Baker gave ``qualified support,''
the press observed, but ``carefully avoided using the words
nuclear-free zone''---for the reason just noted.
. A week later, Iraq offered to ``scrap chemical and mass
destruction weapons if Israel was also prepared to do so,''
Reuters reported. The offer seems to have passed in silence
here. Weapons proliferation for our allies---including Iraq
before August 2---is fine.
. Iraq's more recent call for ``the banning of all weapons of mass
destruction in the region'' as part of a negotiated settlement
of its withdrawal from Kuwait evoked no Western support.
3. So what _is_ Bush concerned about? Domination.
. Iraq violated a fundamental principle of world affairs---that
the energy reserves of the Middle East have to be firmly in the
hands of U.S. energy corporations and trusted U.S. clients like
Saudi Arabia's elites.
. This means Mideast populations do not really benefit from their
own resource, but ``so what,'' says Bush. The West benefits
because Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Qatar are basically
sectors of London and New York. The U.S. government doesn't
care if the Saudi elite administers oil prices because that's
like having it done on Wall Street.
. The U.S. does care if an independent Arab nationalist threatens
to use the resources for domestic purposes. The U.S. opposes
that kind of behavior anywhere in the world. That is why we
``destroy cities to save them.''
. The State Department says Mideast oil is a ``stupendous source
of strategic power'' and ``one of the greatest prizes in world
history.'' So what if it's in the Mideast?
. In Iran in 1953 we overthrew a nationalist parliamentary
regime. Now we threaten a murderous tyrant's regime, although
Hussein was just as much a murderous tyrant before August 2,
when we supported him because doing so furthered U.S.
interests.
4. Why does Bush oppose negotiations? They might work.
. The U.S. is _usually_ against diplomacy. If the U.S. can
establish force as the way to rule the world, the U.S. wins
because it's way ahead in force. If diplomacy succeeds, it
delegitimates militarism, reduces the relevance of military
might and increases the relevance of diplomacy.
. This is also why the U.S. adamantly opposes linkage between
Kuwait and the West Bank. The U.S. supports linkage when it
benefits us. But in this case we're against linkage, and the
reason is not just because Israel is our ally, but because
linkage is a step toward diplomatically resolving the Gulf
_and_ Arab-Israeli crises. The U.S. opposes a _diplomatic_
settlement of either crisis and therefore certainly opposes a
joint diplomatic settlement of both of them.
. When Bush sent 400,000 troops instead of 15,000, which could
have been just as effective in preventing further Iraqi
aggression, he did it to scuttle negotiations and leave only
military might as the arbiter. His worst nightmare is a
negotiated solution that would legitimate the rule of
international law rather than U.S. power.
5. What is the New World Order all about? Same as the old, with
an ominous new wrinkle.
. In the London _Financial Times_ of November 21, 1990, a
respected commentator describes the Gulf crisis as a ``watershed
event in U.S. international relations,'' which will be seen in
history as having ``turned the U.S. military into an
internationally financed public good.'' In the 1990s, he
continues, ``there is no realistic alternative [to] the U.S.
military assuming a more explicitly mercenary role than it has
played in the past.''
. The financial editor of the _Chicago Tribune_ recently put the
point less delicately: we must exploit our ``virtual monopoly in
the security marked . . . as a lever to gain funds and economic
concessions'' from Germany and Japan. The U.S. has ``cornered
the West's security marked'' and will therefore be ``the world's
rent-a-cops.''
. Some will call us ``Hessians,'' he continues, but ``that's a
terribly demeaning phrase for a proud, well-trained, well-
financed and well-respected military'' and whatever anyone may
say, ``we should be able to pound our fists on a few desks'' in
Japan and Europe, and ``extract a fair price for our
considerable services,'' demanding that our rivals ``buy our
bonds at cheap rates, or keep the dollar propped up, or better
yet, pay cash directly into our Treasury.'' ``We could change
this role'' of enforcer, he concludes, ``but with it would go
much of our control over the world economic system.''
6. Why is Bush so eager to wage war? Momentum and preference!
. Having sent a gigantic military force to ensure that any Gulf
resolution would be military, Bush left himself few options.
Either Hussein would withdraw, with or without concessions, or
we would bomb him out. Bush could not maintain so high a level
of force indefinitely nor withdraw without a resolution of the
crisis.
. But Bush has shown that he actually favored war. Why was he so
eager to start a conflagration that could endanger oil
supplies, our place in the Mideast, and international alliances
--all things he certainly holds dear?
. The answer has to be that there is something about the effects
of war that Bush finds desirable. In the ``rubble'' he wants to
``bounce'' in Baghdad, Bush sees a prize worth struggling for.
. What could it be? Peace? No. Justice? No. Stability? No.
So what?
. Bush is seeking the legitimation of war, the end of the ``peace
dividend,'' and the elevation of the U.S. to the status of World
Mercenary Police, thus ensuring years more of U.S.
international domination even as our economy flounders.
_That's his preferred scenario_.
. Additionally, many CEOs and other influential economic and
political figures fear a serious collapse of the U.S. economy.
To push up the price of oil dramatically and ensure that the
super revenues are then invested in U.S. banks is, they think,
one way to avert this collapse. They do not care if this
approach will also mean blood, gore, pain, retribution, and
hate for years to come.
7. What will be the results of war? Rivers of blood.
. If the U.S. military is not curtailed, tens of thousands,
perhaps hundreds of thousands or even a million Arab lives will
be lost.
. Thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of U.S. lives will be
lost.
. Countless Third World lives will be lost via inflated oil
prices and international economic turmoil.
. There will be world wide economic recession. Mideast
destabilization with unknown repercussions. Increased
nightmares for Palestinians. Possible disaster for Israel.
Possible ecological devastation.
. The peace dividend will be reduced or lost. Military
expenditures will be reenlarged.
. The Hessianization of the U.S. and subordination of
international affairs to U.S. mercenary might will proceed.
. A new ``enemy,'' the Moslem world, will help scare the U.S.
public into tolerating outrageous defense appropriations.
. And, if all goes as planned, U.S. corporate officials and state
policy-makers will continue to oversee vast wealth and
unfettered power---the real motive for U.S. intervention in the
first place.
8. Why does the U.S. oppose linkage? Fear of isolation.
. There has long been a broad international consensus on a
political settlement of this conflict. The U.S. and Israel
have opposed it and have been isolated in this rejectionism, as
numerous lopsided General Assembly votes (most recently 151--3)
indicate.
. President Bush likes to tell us how James Baker has labored for
peace, but remains silent about the terms of the famed Baker
plan, whose basic principles ban an ``additional Palestinian
state''; bar any ``change in the status of Judea, Samaria, and
Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the
[Israeli] Government,'' preclude any meaningful Palestinian
self-determination; reject negotiations with the PLO, thus
denying Palestinians the right to choose their own political
representation; and call for ``free elections'' under Israeli
military rule.
. Regarding the Palestinian question, it is therefore the world
against George Bush and his predecessors. For this reason,
since long before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the U.S. has
consistently opposed an international conference on the Middle
East.
. Such a conference would lead to pressures for a just political
settlement that the U.S. rejects, since by force they can
maintain an unjust situation. For the same reasons the U.S.
has vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for a political
settlement and blocked other diplomatic initiatives for the
past 20 years.
9. Why oppose war in the Gulf? It's wrong.
. Some liberals oppose a Gulf war on the grounds it will be too
expensive. Usually they mean lost stability, lost resources,
or heightened recession. Sometimes they mean lost U.S. lives.
Rarely do they mean lost Arab lives. While these costs are
real, the best grounds on which to oppose the Gulf War is that
it is not just.
. It is not anti-interventionist. It is not pro-national
sovereignty. It is not pro-international legality. It is not
pro-``a new and more peaceful world order.''
. This war is to reinforce U.S. control of Arab oil. It is to
crush Arab nationalism.
. It is to establish the U.S. as the world's policeman with the
bills paid, whether they like it or not, by whoever we pass
them on to.
. This war should be opposed because it is wrong. We have no
right controlling oil prices. No right administering the
future of the Middle East. And no right becoming the world's
Hessian state, sacrificing much of the U.S. population to a
Third World existence in the process.
. We should oppose this war because we oppose militarism as a
solution to international conflict.
10. What is the logic of our antiwar activism? Raise the social cost.
. Arguments that war is immoral will not deter Bush. Arguments
that he isn't seeing the costs will not change his mind.
. Pursuers of war, including Bush, don't care about Iraqi lives,
American lives, or anyone's lives. The same holds, by and
large, for U.S. media which has yet to discuss the potential
loss of Arab lives as a central cost of war.
. Nor do U.S. warmakers care about subtle concerns of culture or
history. They care about advancing the geopolitical interests
of the U.S. as they are understood by the White House and Wall
Street. That's all.
. To get Bush to reverse his war policies requires that the
public raise costs that warmakers don't want to pay.
. Warmakers do not want to endure an end to business as usual.
They do not want war to cause a new generation to turn to
activism. They dread the escalation of dissent from events
that oppose war, to actions that oppose militarism, to projects
that oppose capitalism.
. These costs curtailed U.S. militarism in Indochina. They can
do the same, and more, in the Gulf.
. Raise the social cost.
11. What should be the focus of our activism? Peace and justice.
. Antiwar activity needs to develop lasting consciousness of the
causes and purposes of U.S. war policies including
understanding underlying institutions. And it also needs to
send a powerful message of dissent.
. Events that focus on ROTC, on campus military centers, such as
military bases or the Pentagon, and that demand an end to war
are excellent.
. Events that focus on centers of domestic suffering that demand
an end to war _and_ and end to militarism _and_ a reallocation
of military resources to social ends, are still more powerful.
. Multi-focused events will reveal and enlarge not only antiwar
militance, but militance extending to gender, race, and class
policies and institutions that war-makers hold even more dear.
Multi-issue events send an even more powerful and threatening
message than single issue efforts, and can have that much more
impact.
. They also have the capacity to build a movement that can last
beyond the Gulf crisis to attack the causes as well as the
symptoms of oppressive institutions. Build a movement not just
for peace, but for peace and justice too.
. Create a multi-issue focus.
12. What tactics should we use? Demonstrate, demand, disobey.
. A gathering of people at a teach-in to learn about U.S.
policies threatens leaders of a country who want people as
ignorant as possible. A march with many constituencies
threatens the leadership of a country who want people as
passive and divided as possible. A march that include civil
disobedience and says that some people are willing to break
laws and, moreover, next time many more will do so, is still
more powerful.
. Create a multi-tactic movement.
. But lasting movements also have to develop a positive component
that can become a center of organizing energy and a place for
learning and support.
. In addition to teach-ins, marches, rallies, and civil
disobedience, we need to create lasting coalitions and
institutional centers of Peace and Justice in occupied
buildings on campuses or in community centers, and/or churches.
. Such student and community centers could be places for people
to do peace work: creating leaflets and banners and writing
letters to GIs. They could be places from which people could
do systematic coordinated canvassing and provide each other
with support and help.
. Further, these campus and community centers could be places
where people consider how their universities or communities
might become centers of peace and conversion rather than
militarism. Create a long-term movement.