% FROM THE NOAM CHOMSKY ARCHIVE
% http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:/usr/tp0x/chomsky.html
% ftp://ftp.cs.cmu.edu/user/cap/chomsky/
% Filename:    articles/chomsky.loot.haiti
% Title:       Letter from Lexington (column)
% Author:      Noam Chomsky
% Appeared-in: Lies of Our Times (LOOT), February 1993
% Source:      Dan Epstein 
% Keywords:    Haiti, Aristide, Clinton
% Synopsis:    US treatment of Haiti crisis, media attention

Letter from Lexington

January 19, 1993

Dear LOOT,

``Recently, the government [of Haiti] has been unusually
aggressive in its defiance of sanctions,'' Pamela Constable
reported in the _Boston Globe_ (Jan. 3, 1993). ``Last week,
[Prime Minister] Bazin ordered 18 human rights monitors not to
travel outside the capital.'' ``In a New Year's state-of-the-
nation speech delivered in a chandeliered hall and attended by
Haiti's elite, Bazin blasted world `hostility' and an effort to
impose a foreign solution. `This is a Haitian crisis and it will
be resolved by Haitians,' he vowed.'' Ruling General Raoul Cedras
agreed, saying ``that Haiti's problems should be resolved by
Haitians, and not by `personalist and electoralist' politics or
by `meddling from overseas' '' (Canute James, _Financial Times_,
Dec. 10, 1992).

Bazin was the US favorite in Haiti's first free elections in
December 1990, and remains so. When he says ``resolved by
Haitians,'' he means _certain_ Haitians, including some of the
14% who voted for him, but not the 67% who elected an activist
priest from a poor parish, a last-minute entry with no wealth, no
guns, no foreign support, in fact nothing going for him but a
grass-roots popular movement of the poor: Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Bazin's bluster and ``unusually aggressive defiance of
sanctions'' did not inconvenience weapons inspectors or pose an
alleged threat to US military aircraft. Rather, he blocked
investigation of ongoing atrocities. This defiance did not call
forth cruise missiles or bombing of Port-au-Prince, angry
condemnations, efforts to implement the OAS embargo, or even the
phone call from Washington, which, according to a Bazin adviser,
is ``all it would take'' to send the ruling Generals back to
quarters (Howard French, _NYT_, Sept. 27, 1992). ``Virtually all
observers agree,'' French added, that little more would be
necessary to call off the current reign of terror and restore the
elected President. But there will be no phone call:
``Washington's deep-seated ambivalence about a leftward-tilting
nationalist whose style diplomats say has sometimes been
disquietingly erratic'' precludes any meaningful pressure, French
explains.  ``Despite much blood on the army's hands, United
States diplomats consider it a vital counterweight to Father
Aristide, whose class-struggle rhetoric . . . threatened or
antagonized traditional power centers at home and abroad.''

The ``counterweight'' is therefore to hold total power while the
``leftward tilting nationalist'' remains in exile, awaiting the
``eventual return'' that Bill Clinton promised on the day that
Haitians boycotted Bazin's military-run parliamentary elections
(Reuters, _BG_, _NYT_, Jan. 19, 1993). Meanwhile, the
``traditional power centers'' in Haiti and the US will carry on
with class struggle as usual, with terror as needed for plunder
to proceed unhampered. And the new enthusiasts for (highly
selective) ``humanitarian intervention''---cheerfully oblivious
to history and such tiresome topics as the institutional roots of
policy---will rule off their agenda such ``intervention'' as a
few stern words to the killers.

Aristide was inaugurated in February 1991, and ousted in a bloody
military coup on September 30. There are two versions of what
happened in the interim, both agreeing that the rampant state
terror of earlier years radically declined while ``the flow of
boat people all but dried up'' (Editorial, _NYT_, Jan 17, 1993),
and that both the terror and the flow surged with the September
coup. Note that these are purely accidental correlations, given
the doctrine that those in flight are ``economic refugees.''

One version is given by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs in
Washington. ``Under Aristide,'' it reports, ``for the first time
in the republic's tortured history, Haiti seemed to be on the
verge of tearing free from the fabric of despotism and tyranny
which had smothered all previous attempts at democratic
expression and self-determination.'' His victory ``represented
more than a decade of civic engagement and education on his
part,'' spearheaded by local activists of the Church, small
grassroots-based communities, and other popular organizations
that formed the basis of the Lavalas (``flood'') movement that
swept him into power, ``a textbook example of participatory,
`bottom-up' and democratic political development.'' His
government sought ``the empowerment of the poor,'' a ``populist
model'' committed to ``social and economic justice, popular
political participation and openness in all governmental
affairs''---not exactly Washington's cup of tea. Aristide's
balancing of the budget and ``trimming of a bloated bureaucracy''
led to a ``stunning success'' that also made White House planners
``extremely uncomfortable'': he secured over half a billion
dollars in aid from the international lending community,
indicating ``that Haiti was slipping out of Washington's
financial orbit'' and ``demonstrating a degree of sovereignty in
its political affairs'' (COHA, ``Sun Setting on Hopes for Haitian
Democracy,'' Jan. 6, 1992).

A different version is given by _Times_ Haiti correspondent
Howard French. He reports that Aristide governed ``with the aid
of fear,'' leaning ``heavily on Lavalas, an unstructured movement
of affluent idealists and long-exiled leftists'' whose model was
China's Cultural Revolution. His power hunger led to ``troubles
with civil society.'' Furthermore, ``Haitian political leaders
and diplomats say, the growing climate of vigilantism as well as
increasingly strident statements by Father Aristide blaming the
wealthier classes for the poverty of the masses encouraged'' the
coup (Oct. 22, 1991). ``Although he retains much of the popular
support that enabled him to win 67% of the popular vote in the
country's December 1990 elections, Father Aristide was overthrown
in part because of concerns among politically active people over
his commitment to the Constitution, and growing fears of
political and class-based violence, which many believe the
President endorsed'' (Jan. 12, 1992).

French's reports are news, not opinion, so we must take them to
be objective truth. As explained by _New Republic_ editor Andrew
Sullivan, American journalism, unlike the debased counterpart
elsewhere, is ``a selfless and objective pursuit of the public
good'' (_NYT Book Review_, Jan. 17, 1993). Q.E.D.

Portrayal of objective truth requires a refined vocabulary. Take
``civil society.'' Note that this concept excludes the large
majority of the population, which continued to support Aristide
with passion and courage; but it includes ``the army and the
nation's tiny economic elite,'' as French identifies ``Aristide's
opponents'' (_NYT_, Jan. 15, 1993). The folks in the gold-plated
Cadillacs are the ``politically active people'' and ``Haitian
political leaders,'' not the organizers of the grass-roots
movements. That these political leaders abhor ``political and
class-based violence'' is amply attested by their historic
practice, renewed after the coup. As for the ``strident
statements blaming the wealthier classes for the poverty of the
masses,'' the thought is so outlandish and absurd that it could
arise only in the minds of the affluent Red Guards of Lavalas---
the _Times_ version of the ``textbook example of participatory,
`bottom-up' and democratic political development'' depicted by
COHA.

Given the assault against ``civil society'' by the Maoist exiles,
we can understand why US policy shifted so radically as Aristide
took office. In the past, the US had regarded state terror with a
tolerant eye, happily funding it with occasional lapses when the
blood flowed too openly, and applauding the worthy advance
towards democracy that is a permanent feature of client regimes.
But with Aristide's election, for ``the first time'' Washington
became ``deeply concerned with human rights and the rule of law
in Haiti,'' Amy Wilentz observes. Throughout the earlier terror,
``international human-rights advocates and democratic observers
had begged the State Department to consider helping the
democratic opposition in Haiti. But no steps were taken by the
United States to strengthen anything but the executive and the
military until Aristide won the presidency. Then, all of a
sudden, the United States began to think about how it could help
those Haitians eager to limit the powers of the executive or to
replace the government constitutionally.'' USAID's huge
``Democracy Enhancement'' project was ``specifically designed to
fund those sectors of the Haitian political spectrum where
opposition to the Aristide government could be encouraged''
(Wilentz, _Reconstruction_, vol. 1.4, 1992).

As the army once again imposed a reign of terror, General Cedras
accused Aristide of ruling with torture, murder, and a ``reign of
terror.'' He presented OAS negotiators with ``a thick, bound
dossier'' on Aristide's alleged crimes. A senior military source
denounced Aristide's contempt for democracy; the proof is that he
``never understood'' that ``according to the Constitution, the
president of Haiti is just a nominal president,'' while the
``real'' and ``effective commander'' is ``the commander and chief
of the army'' (Linda Diebel, _Toronto Star_, Oct. 10, 1991).

The State Department is reported to have ``circulated a thick
notebook filled with alleged human rights violations'' under
Aristide, Wilentz writes, referring presumably to the Cedras
dossier, ``something it had not done under the previous rulers,
Duvalierists and military men,'' for whom aid was justified on
the basis of ``unsubstantiated human-rights improvements.''
According to journalists in Haiti, the US Ambassador called in
the correspondents for the _New York Times_ and _Washington Post_
for a briefing on the ``dossier'' that the army command had
compiled, perhaps with a little help from their friends.

The OAS imposed an embargo, which the US joined. The US has a
certain experience with embargoes; it is, in fact, far and away
the world champion, having even gained the prize of condemnation
by the World Court for its illegal economic warfare. Washington
is also believed to have some experience in pressuring others
when it wants its rules obeyed. This case was different however:
``civil society'' in Haiti opposed the embargo, while the poor
majority pleaded for firm enforcement. Accordingly, Washington
never figured out a way to freeze the assets of ``civil society''
or to hinder their shopping trips to Miami and New York by
cancelling visas. It was unable to detect the drug operations
that financed the terror and rapacity of ``civil society,'' or to
induce the Dominican army to monitor the border to impede the
flow of goods that takes care of its wants. And the phones were
out of order, once again, when the time came to call friends and
servants abroad to suggest that they might take note of the
embargo.

If this uncharacteristic impotence elicited some thoughts here
about our humanitarian and democratic passions, they were not
easy to detect.

Within a few weeks, the matter was academic. On February 4, 1992,
the US lifted the embargo for assembly plants, ``under heavy
pressure from American businesses with interests in Haiti,'' Lee
Hockstader reported in the _Washington Post_. The editors judged
the decision wise: the embargo was a ``fundamental political
miscalculation'' that ``has caused great suffering, but not among
the gunmen. Since it hasn't served its purpose, it is good that
it is being relaxed''---not tightened so as to serve its
professed purpose, as those who endure the ``great suffering''
are pleading. A few months later, it was noted in the small print
that Washington ``is apparently continuing to relax controls on
goods going to Port-au-Prince from the United States,'' allowing
export of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides (_WP weekly_, Feb.
17, 10, 1992; Barbara Crossette, _NYT_, May 28, 1992). For
January-October 1992, U.S. trade with Haiti came to $265 million,
according to the Department of Commerce.

The _Times_ worked hard to place the proper spin on the February
4 decision. Under the headline ``U.S. Plans to Sharpen Focus of
Its Sanctions Against Haiti,'' Barbara Crossette reported that
``The Bush Administration said today that it would modify its
embargo against Haiti's military Government to punish
anti-democratic forces and ease the plight of workers who lost
jobs because of the ban on trade.'' The State Department would be
``fine tuning'' its economic sanctions, the ``latest move'' in
Administration efforts to find ``more effective ways to hasten
the collapse of what the Administration calls an illegal
Government in Haiti'' (_NYT_, Feb. 5, 1992). In short, the ``fine
tuning'' punishes the anti-democratic forces who applauded it in
order to benefit the workers who strenuously opposed it.
Puzzling? Not to the properly educated.

The next step was to reduce the erratic extremist to a
figurehead, while authority is placed in the hands of Marc Bazin,
the US favorite and therefore a ``moderate''---a useful category,
which, in its day, has included pleasant figures from Mussolini
and Hitler to Suharto and genocidal Guatemalan Generals. That
result was achieved in June 1992, when Bazin was inaugurated as
Prime Minister, undisturbed by a phone call.

As the year ended, Lally Weymouth instructed the incoming US
President that if he is ``genuinely concerned about improving the
welfare of the Haitian people,'' he should end the embargo, with
its ``dubious purpose'' of restoring the elected President, and
facilitate a ``political settlement'' (_WP_, Dec. 18, 1992).
Plainly such a settlement has little room for an ``extremely
radical anti-American priest'' who ``exacerbated class strife,''
``showed brazen intolerance,'' and ``condoned violence and mob
terror'' so extreme that ``with opposition leaders fearing for
their lives, the Haitian army staged a coup.'' The solution
should be based---surprise!---on the US candidate who lost
overwhelmingly in the election, but who the ``elected parliament
. . . chose'' as Prime Minister after the coup. ``Bazin's job now
is to find a political solution'' and direct policy, our job is
to help him, and the job of the press is to explain why this is
right and just.

Fortunately, it's easy. ``Bazin is an impressive man of moderate
sensibility.'' We must therefore ``delay'' Aristide's return and
pursue ``a policy aimed at advancing the interests of the Haitian
people rather than one that promotes Aristide,'' who lives ``in
style'' in Washington while the people suffer; and, in their
stupidity, continue to support him fervently and call for his
return---perhaps to cut off his lavish life style. If ``Bazin's
moderation doesn't appear to pay off,'' there might be a ``more
traditional and brutal Haitian military dictatorship'' than the
current ``moderate'' one, which ignorant Haitians describe as
reminiscent of the Duvalier era. If we support Bazin, Weymouth
continues, there won't be any refugee problem, because contrary
to the ``prevailing wisdom in liberal circles,'' 99% are
``economic refugees,'' the ``man of moderate sensibility''
estimates.

The _Post_ refrain, incidentally, is familiar: from the days of
Hitler, ``moderates'' have been supported with the same argument.

The right kind of solution is outlined further by correspondent
John Goshko (_WP_, Dec. 20). It would ``delay indefinitely'' the
return to Haiti of the ``radical priest with anti-American
leanings'' whose ``strident populism led the Haitian armed forces
to seize power,'' and would ``allow Bazin or some other prime
minister to govern in his place.'' There is a problem with Bazin.
Though he is ``well-known and well-regarded in the United
States,'' unfortunately ``the masses in Haiti consider him a
front man for military and business interests.'' So perhaps
someone else will have to be selected to represent the interests
of ``civil society.''

The right solution was put forth in February 1992, but fell
through. It is now up to Clinton to implement it, amidst a chorus
of approval and self-acclaim. The basic idea is indicated in
paragraph 17 of a front-page story on Clinton's decision to
reverse his campaign pledge and continue ``forcibly returning
Haitians who try to emigrate to the United States.'' ``During his
confirmation hearings for Secretary of State,'' Warren
Christopher ``expressed support for Father Aristide but stopped
short of calling for his reinstatement as President. `There is no
question in my mind that because of the election, he has to be
part of the solution to this,' Mr. Christopher said. `I don't
have a precise system worked out in my mind as to how he would be
part of the solution, but certainly he cannot be ignored in the
matter' '' (Elaine Sciolino, _NYT_, Jan. 15, 1993).

A ringing reaffirmation of our fabled ``yearning for democracy.''

Honest commentary would place all of this in the context of our
unwavering opposition to freedom and human rights in Haiti for no
less than 200 years, including the murderous rampage under Wilson
that imposed, under Marine bayonets, the Constitution that
allowed US corporations to buy up the country, and that set the
stage for much that followed. As usual, we'll wait a long time
for that.

Sincerely,


Noam