% FROM THE NOAM CHOMSKY ARCHIVE
% http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:/usr/tp0x/chomsky.html
% ftp://ftp.cs.cmu.edu/user/cap/chomsky/
% Filename:    articles/
% Title:       Is Peace At Hand? 
% Author:      Noam Chomsky
% Appeared-in: Z Magazine (formerly ``Zeta''), January 1988 (premiere issue)
% Source:      Dan Epstein 
% Keywords:    Nicaragua, Central America
% Synopsis:    
% See-also:    articles/chomsky

IS PEACE AT HAND? 
Noam Chomsky
November 1987


On August 7, 1987, the Central American Presidents signed a peace
agreement in Guatemala City which, if implemented, could have a
significant impact in the region.{note: For discussion of the
background, and references not cited here, see my _Culture of
Terrorism_ (South End, 1988).} The agreement does not address the
causes of the violence and suffering that plague these long-term
U.S. dependencies, but it might restrict U.S. intervention, a
prerequisite to any constructive change.  The circumstances of
the accords should be carefully studied by those who hope to
influence state policy, but I will defer this crucial topic,
keeping here to the prospects for implementation of the accords.

In approaching this question, we must bear in mind that we live
in the Age of Orwell, in which every term has two meanings: its
literal meaning, largely irrelevant in practice, and the
operative meaning, devised in the interests of established power.
Accordingly, there are two versions of the accords to consider:
the actual text, and the radically different Washington version.

We therefore face two questions: (1) Can the accords be
implemented in terms of their actual content?  (2) Can they be
implemented according to the Washington version?  The first of
these questions is only an academic exercise, but it is
illuminating to consider it nonetheless.


The Irrelevant Facts

Keeping to the actual substance of the accords, there is no
possibility that they can be implemented, as a review of the
initial three-month period clearly demonstrates.

The accords identify one factor as ``an indispensable element to
achieving a stable and lasting peace in the region,'' namely,
termination of any form of aid ``to irregular forces or insurgent
movements'' on the part of ``regional or extraregional''
governments.  As a corollary, the Central American governments
agree to deny their territory to any such groups.  This demand is
directed at the United States and the client states it has used
for the attack against Nicaragua by what contra lobbyists
candidly describe in internal documents as a ``proxy force,''
organized, trained, supplied and controlled by the CIA.

This central feature of the accords is redundant, since such
actions are barred by a higher authority: by international law
and treaty, hence by the supreme law of the land under the U.S.
Constitution, which we are enjoined to celebrate this year.  The
fact was underscored by the World Court in June 1986 as it
condemned the United States for its ``unlawful use of force''
against Nicaragua and called upon it to desist from these crimes.
Congress responded by voting $100 million of aid and freeing the
CIA to direct the attack and to use its own funds on an unknown
scale.  The U.S. vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling
on all states to observe international law and voted against a
General Assembly resolution to the same effect, joined by Israel
and El Salvador.  On Nov. 12, 1987, the General Assembly again
called for ``full and immediate compliance'' with the World Court
decision.  This time only Israel joined with the U.S. in opposing
adherence to international law, another blow to the Central
American accords, unreported by the national press as usual.

The media had dismissed the World Court as a ``hostile forum''
whose decisions are irrelevant, while liberal advocates of world
order explained that the U.S. must disregard the Court decision.
With this reaction, U.S. elites clearly articulate their
self-image: the United States is a lawless terrorist state, which
stands above the law and is entitled to undertake violence, as it
chooses, in support of its objectives.  The reaction to the
``indispensable element'' of the Central America accords merely
reiterated that conviction.

To ensure that the accords would be undermined, the U.S. at once
directed its proxy forces to escalate military actions, also
increasing the regular supply flights that are required to keep
them in the field.  These had passed the level of one a day in
the preceding months in support of the ``spring offensive,''
designed to achieve sufficient levels of terror and disruption to
impress Congress.  The proxy army followed Washington orders to
attack ``soft targets'' such as farm cooperatives and health
clinics instead of ``trying to duke it out with the Sandinistas
directly,'' as explained by General John Galvin, commander of the
U.S. Southern Command, who added that with these tactics, aimed
at civilians lacking means of defense against armed terrorist
bands, prospects for the contras should improve.  The State
Department officially authorized such attacks, with the support
of media doves.  There are other terrorist states, but to my
knowledge, the United States is alone today in _officially_
endorsing international terrorism.  We see here another
illustration of the self-image of U.S. elites: in a terrorist
culture, all that counts is the success of violence.
Accordingly, debate in Congress and the media focused on the
question of whether the violence could succeed, with ``doves''
arguing that the proxy army was inept and hawks replying that it
must be given more time and aid to prove itself as a successful
terrorist force---putting euphemisms aside.

CIA-directed supply flights into Nicaragua doubled by
mid-September according to the _Los Angeles Times_, while
Nicaraguan sources that have been accurate in the past, though
ignored, alleged that violations of Nicaraguan airspace rose from
70 in September to 110 in October, most of them supply flights,
particularly in areas where the government had declared a
unilateral cease-fire.{note: AP, Nov. 1, 1987.} Before the OAS,
President Ortega reported 140 supply flights during the
three-month initial phase of the accords, an estimate dismissed
as far too low by contra commander Adolfo Calero, who said that
``his radar is not working very well.''{note: AP, Nov. 11, 1987.}
A review of the major media reveals only a few phrases alluding
to these matters,{note: Marjorie Miller, _Los Angeles Times_,
Sept. 14, 1987; AP, Nov. 6, 1987; _Mesoamerica_, Oct. 1987; Peter
Ford, _Christian Science Monitor_, Nov. 2.} a highly illuminating
fact.  Of these few references, some reveal editorial adjustments
in a further service to state violence; thus the _New York
Times_, which suppressed this crucial issue throughout the
three-month period, did cite the statements by Ortega and Calero
on Nov. 12, but where they each spoke of supply flights, the
_Times_ news report downgraded the reference to ``surveillance
flights,'' still a violation of international law and the
agreements, but a much less serious one, and thus less
unacceptable in the newspaper of record.{note: Neil Lewis, _NYT_,
Nov. 12, 1987.  See AP and Pamela Constable, _BG_, same day,
stating the facts correctly.  Constable also cites the World
Court condemnation of the U.S. for unlawful use of force and
violation of treaties in the following sanitized version: the
Court ``found that the Sandinista government's doctrines did not
constitute an international threat and did not justify US
military intervention.''}

``Western military analysts say the contras have been stashing
tons of newly airdropped weapons lately while trying to avoid
heavy combat,'' the _Los Angeles Times_ reported in October.
``Meanwhile, they have stepped up attacks on easy government
targets like the La Patriota farm cooperative . . . where several
militiamen, an elderly woman and her year-old grandson died in a
pre-dawn shelling.''{note: Richard Boudreaux and Marjorie Miller,
_LAT_, Oct. 5.} To select virtually at random from the many cases
deemed unworthy of notice, on Nov. 21, 150 contras attacked two
villages in the southern province of Rio San Juan with 88mm
mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, killing six children and
six adults and injuring 30 others, wire services reported, citing
Nicaraguan radio.  Even cooperatives of religious pacifists who
refuse to bear arms are destroyed by the U.S. terrorist
forces.{note: AP, Nov. 21, 1987; Witness for Peace, _Civilian
Victims of the U.S. Contra War_, February-July 1987, p. 5.} In a
November report on human rights abuses in Nicaragua, barely noted
in the 42nd paragraph of a report on contra successes in the _New
York Times_, Americas Watch described the contras as an ``outlaw
force'' whose continuing abuse of human rights means that ``we
see no way for compliance with the Arias plan's requirement for
respect for human rights other than the dissolution of the
contras and an end to all aid for them by the United States,
Honduras and all others''---the ``indispensable element'' for
peace and an obligation under the irrelevant rule of law.{note:
AP, _BG_, Nov. 6; editorial _WP_, Nov. 6; Lindsey Gruson, _NYT_,
Nov. 5, 1987.}

The U.S. also launched further war games in Honduras, Operation
``Blazing Trail 1987,'' barely noted in the media.  Nicaragua's
protest described them as the ``biggest-ever military maneuvers
in Honduran territory,'' adding that ``we can't see this in any
way as a contribution to peace''---something of an
understatement.{note: _BG_, Nov. 20, 1987.}

Shortly after the accords were signed, the CIA offered
$3000-a-month bribes to 14 Miskito Indian leaders to induce them
to maintain the military conflict.  The spokesman for the Indian
opposition described this as ``a last-ditch U.S. attempt to
undercut their plan to pursue a negotiated settlement with the
Sandinistas,'' UPI reported, adding that U.S. intelligence
officials ``have stressed what they call the strategic importance
of retaining Indian participation in the war to help gain
international support,'' the usual cynical exploitation of
indigenous peoples.  U.S. government officials quoted in the
Mexican press report that the CIA salaries come from a secret
account ``for political projects,'' unrelated to the $100 million
in congressional funding.{note: Brian Barger, UPI, _Philadelphia
Inquirer_, Oct. 22, 1987. _Excelsior_ (Mexico City), Oct. 22,
1987.} The going rate is considerably higher for the wealthy
businessmen who serve as CIA democrats-for-hire, for example,
Alfonso Robelo, who receives $10,000 monthly tax-free, or Arturo
Cruz, whose secret $7000-a-month subsidy was transferred from the
CIA to Oliver North's account for fear that Congress would expose
his illegal lobbying and the fraud he perpetrated as a paid U.S.
agent in connection with the campaign to disrupt the unwanted
Nicaraguan elections of 1984---elections that did not take place
according to the media, which regularly contrast the ``elected
presidents'' of the U.S. client states with the Nicaraguan
dictator Ortega, who was not ``elected'' according to official
doctrine.

Undersecretary of State Elliott Abrams conducted a news
conference by radio in the Central American capitals on Oct. 22,
unreported in the national press, at which he announced that the
United States will ``never accept a Soviet satellite in Central
America''---meaning a country that is not a loyal U.S.
satellite---and that ``We're going to continue the aid to the
resistance,'' to be sure, in violation of the ``indispensable
element'' for peace.  The Reagan administration announced its
intention to seek congressional backing for its war, and Congress
obliged by providing ``humanitarian'' aid---meaning, any form of
aid that the government chooses to send---in direct violation of
the accords.  Secretary of State George Shultz informed the OAS
that the U.S. would persist in the unlawful use of force by its
``resistance fighters'' until a ``free Nicaragua'' is established
by Washington standards, thus consigning the accords to oblivion,
along with international law.  This announcement was noted in a
140-word item in the _Times_ stressing Washington's intent to
give the accords ``every chance,'' while a headline in the
liberal _Boston Globe_ reported approvingly that the U.S. is
``easing stance.''{note: AP, Nov. 10; Pamela Constable, _BG_,
Nov. 11; AP, _NYT_, Nov. 11, 1987, p. 14.}

While the media and Congress took note of Washington's plans for
the future, the actual steps taken to undermine the central
elements of the peace agreements passed in virtual silence, in
accord with the principle that the United States is entitled to
employ violence as it chooses.  The same basic principle explains
the elite consensus, including the most outspoken doves, that
Nicaragua must not be permitted to obtain aircraft to defend its
territory.  The pretense of liberal Congressmen and others that
such aircraft would be a threat to the United States may be
dismissed with no comment.  The real intent is obvious: the
terrorist superpower must be free to penetrate Nicaraguan
airspace at will for surveillance and coordination of the attacks
on ``soft targets'' by its proxy forces, and to provide them with
arms and supplies.

These crucial facts suffice to demonstrate that in terms of their
irrelevant substance, the accords were dead before the ink was
dry, with the full support of congressional liberals and elite
opinion generally.

Note that as tacitly conceded on all sides, the proxy forces bear
no resemblance to guerrillas.  Rather, they are, by the standards
of the region, a well-equipped mercenary army maintained by
overwhelming U.S. power; their supporters insist that they would
collapse if this unlawful aid and control were to be withdrawn.
The contrast to authentic guerrillas, as in El Salvador, is
dramatic, but suppressed, in the interest of maintaining the
Washington fiction of a ``symmetry'' between Nicaragua and El
Salvador.  There is indeed a symmetry, though not the one put
forth by Washington and its Free Press.  In both countries, there
is a terrorist army attacking ``soft targets'' and slaughtering
civilians, and in both countries, it is organized and maintained
by the United States: the army of El Salvador, and the proxy army
attacking Nicaragua from foreign bases.  The symmetry reaches to
fine details.  In El Salvador too, the U.S. mercenary forces
attack cooperatives, killing, raping and abducting members, as
Americas Watch has reported.{note: _The Civilian Toll
1986--1987_, Americas Watch, Aug. 30, 1987; Americas Watch
Petition to U.S. Trade Representative, May 29, 1987.}

Let us turn now to a secondary matter, the response of the
countries of the region.  Honduras announced at once that it
would not observe the accords.  The government refused to concede
the existence of contra camps within the country, and announced
that no verification would be permitted until Nicaragua satisfies
Washington of its compliance, by whatever standards the terrorist
superpower chooses to impose.  Honduras refused to form even a
token National Commission of Reconciliation.  After domestic
protest, it finally did so two days before the deadline, on
November 3, but, as President Azcona explained, the Commission
``will not do anything'' and will only serve to ``fulfill a
requirement.''{note: AP, Nov. 4, 1987; _Mesoamerica_, Nov. 1987.}
Hence with regard to internal problems too, the accords are dead
as far as Honduras is concerned.

The accords call for establishment of ``justice, freedom and
democracy'' in the states of the region, and these are serious
problems in Honduras.  The country is under effective military
rule behind a thin civilian facade, and as the U.S. moved to
convert it into a military base in the 1980s, human rights
violations substantially increased.  Hundreds of thousands of
peasants are starving to death in the south while the country
exports food.  Thousands have been forcefully expelled by the
contras from the areas where the government denies their
existence.  The head of the Christian Democratic Party reports
that ``there is institutional torture, there are more than 150
disappeared people, there are assassinations and exiles, and
capital punishment is legal, as can be seen by assassinations
carried out by the state.'' Thousands of peasants, unemployed
people, and common criminals have been imprisoned for years
without trial.  Much of the state terror is traceable to a
CIA-trained elite battalion, a standard pattern.  The leader of a
peasant organization, one of 14 suspected ``subversives''
arrested by the police in October, stated that he was tortured to
force him to confess links to guerrillas.  Police and soldiers
arrested, tortured and killed students and peasants in a series
of October actions.  Ramon Custodio, president of the Commission
for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America and of the
Honduran Human Rights Commission, stated in late October that
killings by the security forces are becoming ``more blatant,''
citing the murder of a trade union leader, unarmed young men, and
30 criminals, and adding that ``political prisoners are not given
the chance to be taken alive.'' As the first three-month phase of
the accords ended, he stated at an international press conference
(reported in the Mexican press) that the human rights situation
had become worse in Honduras since 1985: ``Before there was talk
of disappearances and torture; now they simply kill. . . .''
including army deserters, who are killed when captured.  He added
that the human rights situations ``have deteriorated'' in
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras since the accords were
signed, so that ``the little hope there is that human rights will
improve in the region is steadily decreasing.''{note: Donn
Downey, _Toronto Globe and Mail_, Oct. 28; Manuel Torres
Calderon, _Excelsior_ (Mexico City), Oct. 7; COHA's _Washington
Report on the Hemisphere_, Oct. 28; _Latinamerica Press_ (Peru),
Oct.  29; _Excelsior_, Nov. 4, 1987.}

Such continuing atrocities, and the refusal of the government to
undertake the steps required by the accords, pass without comment
in the Free Press, which also fails to note that the accords
stress the need to overcome ``profound divisions'' within each
society and that the mechanisms proposed are aimed at
establishing ``justice'' as well as _meaningful_ democracy, not
merely empty forms designed to ensure the funding of repression
by a compliant Congress that pretends not to see.

In the terror states, Guatemala and El Salvador, the question of
compliance with the accords can scarcely be raised, and no one is
raising it.  Consider freedom of the press.  We hear a great deal
about _La Prensa_, including many fabrications, for example, that
this is the journal that courageously opposed Somoza; in fact,
when the owners made clear their commitment to the old order of
privilege and exploitation, the editor left with 80% of the staff
to form _El Nuevo Diario_, which can fairly claim to be the
successor to _La Prensa_, if a newspaper is defined in terms of
its editor and staff, not its owners and plant.  _La Prensa_ was
suspended by the government the day after the U.S. effectively
declared war on Nicaragua, in the terms used by elated Reagan
administration officials as the Democrat-controlled House passed
the contra aid bill.  _La Prensa_ was funded by the terrorist
superpower attacking Nicaragua, and the journal supported this
attack.  The fact that it had been allowed to publish at all has
few if any precedents.  Now it is publishing again, still
supporting the war against Nicaragua while the superpower
conducting the war provides it with ``essential'' funding
according to its director, contra supporter Jaime Chamorro;
again, an unprecedented phenomenon.  We should also bear in mind
the unreported fact that in much of Nicaragua, radio and
television are dominated by the United States and its client
states, demonizing the Sandinistas in the manner that has been so
effective at home and inducing people in areas where this is the
prime ``information'' source to ``dread the Sandinistas as if
they were the devil incarnate,'' as Joe Eldridge reports in a
study of Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras.{note: _Latinamerica
press_, Nov. 19, 1987.} One should not underestimate the means
available to a terrorist superpower that operates with few
domestic constraints.

Let us turn now to freedom of the press in Washington's terror
states.  In El Salvador there was once an independent press: _La
Cronica_ and _El Independiente_.  They were not funded by a
superpower attacking El Salvador, and they were not censored.
Rather, one paper was closed when army tanks surrounded its
offices after a series of attacks including the machine-gunning
of a 14-year-old newsboy and bombing and assassination attempts
that drove the editor out of the country; the other was closed
when the security forces seized the editor and an associate,
disembowelled them with machetes, and shot them.  Is anyone
calling for the reopening of _La Cronica_ and _El Independiente_?
Of course not, for two good and sufficient reasons: (1)
Washington has commanded us to focus on _La Prensa_ and
Nicaragua, where nothing remotely comparable has happened, and
being loyal cowards, we naturally obey; (2) the idea of opening
an independent press in El Salvador is absurd.  It would be
necessary to send in an international army to deter the U.S.-run
security forces and prevent the murder of the staff, if such
media ever approached the condition that according to U.S. law
justifies state control over speech: that is, if they posed a
``clear and present danger,'' namely, to the system of privilege
maintained by U.S. violence.

Accordingly, we do not speak of freedom of press in El Salvador.
Or in Guatemala, where there has also been no censorship, and no
reporting of such trivialities as the slaughter of tens of
thousands of people in the past decade.  The reason for the
oversight is that some 50 journalists were murdered by the
security forces, some in spectacular fashion.  There is therefore
no need for censorship, which we abhor.

Meanwhile U.S. government propaganda relayed by the media as
``news'' assures us that Duarte ``gave the rebels free access to
the press'' (_New York Times_ Central America correspondent James
LeMoyne){note: _NYT_, Nov. 29, 1987.}; technically true, since no
law bars such access, only the workings of the market
supplemented by state terror.

The real attitudes of U.S. elites towards freedom of the press
are revealed further by the response to events elsewhere during
the same period.  In the Philippines, the government closed three
radio stations and threatened others on October 7, accusing them
of ``glorifying the enemies of the Government and openly defying
the Government of President Aquino by continuously transmitting
the propaganda of right-wing rebel groups and other enemies of
the state.'' This ``crackdown on the media'' was reported, but
without comment, along with the outlawing of the opposition
(Communist) party that had been legalized by the Marcos
dictatorship, police raids against ``suspected communists,'' and
government authorization of vigilante groups---that is, death
squads.{note: AP, _NYT_, Oct. 8; Keith Richburg, _WP_, Oct. 8;
Clayton Jones, _CSM_, Nov. 10, 1987.} There were no calls for
organizing a ``democratic resistance'' to overthrow this
``totalitarian'' state, though they would be heard quickly enough
if Aquino were to undertake measures of social reform and
democratization that would threaten the interests of U.S.
corporations or the U.S. bases.

The major U.S. client state, which is endlessly lauded as a
stellar democracy, provides even more dramatic insight into the
real principles that animate those who courageously condemn
Nicaraguan ``totalitarianism.'' Shortly after _La Prensa_ was
suspended, Israel permanently closed two Jerusalem newspapers on
the grounds that ``although we offer them freedom of expression
. . . it is forbidden to permit them to exploit this freedom in
order to harm the State of Israel.'' The closure was upheld by
the High Court on the grounds that ``It is inconceivable that the
State of Israel should allow terrorist organizations which seek
to destroy it to set up businesses in its territory, legitimate
as they may be''; the government had accused these two Arab
newspapers of receiving support from hostile groups.  To my
knowledge, the only mention of these facts in a daily newspaper
was in a letter of mine in the _Boston Globe_.  As _La Prensa_
was reopened, Israel closed a Nazareth political journal,
alleging that it supports the PLO, and shut down an Arab-owned
news office in Nablus on a similar charge, all ``legal'' under
the state of emergency that has been in force since 1948.{note:
On the State of Emergency, see Avigdor Feldman, B.  Michael,
_Hadashot_, Aug. 14, 1987.} None of this was reported here; _New
York Times_ correspondent Thomas Friedman chose the day of the
closing of the Nablus office to produce one of his regular odes
to freedom of expression in Israel.{note: Oct. 26, 1987.}
Similarly, the destruction of the independent press in El
Salvador never merited an editorial comment in the _Times_, along
with numerous other atrocities, even the assassination of the
Archbishop with the apparent complicity of the security forces.

The libertarian passions of U.S. elites are very precisely
focused, much as in the case of other commissars, who condemn
abuses in U.S. domains while lauding the progress towards freedom
in the ``peoples' democracies.''

In other respects as well, the terror states cannot comply with
the accords as long as the U.S.-backed security forces remain in
command, tolerating the civilian facade as long as it can extort
money from the U.S. Congress, much of it a bribe to the wealthy
that flows back to U.S. banks.  Consider the National
Commissions of Reconciliation called for by the accords.  In
Nicaragua, the Commission, formed in August, is headed by
Cardinal Obando, the most vocal and prominent critic of the
regime.  In El Salvador it is headed by Alvaro Maga?a [accented
character did not scan---JBE.], the conservative banker who was
the U.S. candidate for president in 1982, therefore president,
and was virtually limited to the right wing.  This does not even
approach the level of black humor, which is perhaps why it is
passed over in silence, just as the outright refusal of Honduras
to appoint even a farcical Commission was not reported in the
_New York Times_ for 5 weeks, and its subsequent fate, barely
noted.{note: James LeMoyne, Nov.  15, mentioned that Honduras had
established a Commission but that it had as yet done nothing.} In
Guatemala, the Archbishop, an outspoken defender of human rights,
was not even nominated by the Church, no doubt by prearrangement
with the military-run government.

In both of the terror states, the security forces maintain
obedience by violence.  According to the Church human rights
office Tutela Legal, in El Salvador ``death squad killings jumped
from an average of four to five per month during the first part
of this year to around 10 per month in September and October,''
higher still in November.{note: Brook Larmer, _CSM_, Nov. 23,
1987.  The Council on Hemispheric Affairs estimates
assassinations, abductions, and disappearances at a dozen a
month; _News and Analysis_, Nov. 10, 1987.} Chris Norton, the
only U.S. journalist reporting regularly from El Salvador,
observes (abroad) that the real numbers are unknown because most
death squad killings ``have taken place in rural areas and few of
them have been reported.'' Amadeo Ramos, one of the founders of
the Indian Association ANIS, reports that an Indian settlement
was bombed by the army and ``the bodies of several Indians were
found in a remote area thrown in a ditch'' in mid-November.{note:
_Latinamerica press_ (Peru), 19 Nov., 1987.  Diego Ribadeneira,
_BG_, Nov. 29, 1987.} To mention a few cases in San Salvador
itself, two activists of the Mothers of the Disappeared
(CoMadres) were abducted by Treasury police on September 3, two
days after the head of the University of El Salvador Employees
Union was kidnapped by heavily armed men.  In another case, which
was actually reported here, the president of the Human Rights
Commission, Herbert Anaya, was murdered while taking his children
to school.  A former president, Marianela Garcia Villas, had been
killed by security forces on the pretext that she was a
guerrilla, and other members had been murdered or ``disappeared''
by the security forces.  Anaya had been arrested and tortured by
the Treasury police in May 1986, along with other Commission
members.  While in prison, they continued their work, compiling a
160-page report of testimony of over 430 political prisoners, who
gave details of their torture, in one case, electrical torture by
a North American major in uniform.  This report, one of the most
explicit and comprehensive in existence for any country, was
smuggled out of the prison, along with a videotape of testimony,
and distributed to the U.S. media, which had no interest in
material so lacking in ideological serviceability.  After Anaya
was released in a prisoner exchange, he was repeatedly denounced
by the government and threatened, also informed that he headed a
list of Commission workers to be killed.  Lacking the protection
that might have been afforded by some media visibility here, he
was killed, probably by death squads associated with the security
forces, as indicated by Archbishop Rivera y Damas in an
unreported statement.{note: AP, Nov. 15, 1987, reporting the
Archbishop's homily at the Metropolitan Cathedral where he ``said
the Legal Office [Tutela Legal] had information a death squad was
responsible,'' citing also other death squad killings.}

As in the past, labor activists are a primary target.  In
violation of congressional legislation, the U.S. Trade
Representative rejected an Americas Watch petition to review El
Salvador ``solely on the grounds that it is appropriate for the
Salvadoran armed forces to arrest, interrogate, and imprison
trade unionists whom the Department of State considers to be
opponents of the Duarte Government'' (Americas Watch).  The
petition cited numerous examples of state terror directed against
the labor movement, a matter of no interest here.  As in the case
of freedom of press, concern over labor rights is precisely
focused among U.S. elites: Poland and Nicaragua, but not the
client states such as El Salvador and Israel, where the
``socialist'' trade union is in the forefront of the denial of
minimal rights to the Palestinian workers who provide cheap labor
under abysmal conditions.{note: Americas Watch Petition, May 29,
1987.  Marty Rosenbluth, International Labour Reports, Yorkshire,
England; reprinted in _News from Within_ (West Jerusalem), Oct.
31, 1987.}

The severe violations of the accords by Duarte's security forces
and the lethal network associated with them pass with little
comment in a terrorist culture, where the Free Press assures us
that President Duarte ``has gone considerably further [than the
Sandinistas] in carrying out the letter of the treaty'' though
perhaps he too is not ``particularly committed to its spirit of
reconciliation,'' since he ``is trying to split the leftist rebel
alliance''---nothing more (James LeMoyne).{note: _NYT_, Nov. 29,
1987.}

The official story throughout has been that Duarte represents the
``moderate center,'' unable to control the ``violence by both
ultrarightists and by the Marxist guerrillas'' (James
LeMoyne){note: Nov.  4, 1987.}; an accompanying photo shows New
York Mayor Koch being greeted by the Defense Minister, General
Vides Casanova, who presided over the slaughter of some 60,000
people, in accord with his doctrine that ``the armed forces are
prepared to kill 200,000--300,000, if that's what it takes to
stop a Communist takeover.'' In the irrelevant world of fact, as
the _Times_ has occasionally conceded in the small print, the
violence has overwhelmingly been traceable to the security
forces.  A _Times_ editorial noted the Anaya assassination---as a
proof of Duarte's ``courage'' in ``defying'' the death squads for
which he has long served as a fig leaf.  This reaction
demonstrates that there are no limits to tolerance of virtuous
atrocities.  Buried in a news story, the same day, is the fact
that the killers were using sophisticated weapons available only
to the ``right-wing death squads''---that is, the assassination
squads of Duarte's security forces, as _Times_ editors and
correspondents know, but will not say.{note: Oct. 28, 1987.}
Meanwhile President Duarte, in his usual manner, blamed the left
for the assassination, just as he has regularly blamed the
victims for their torture and murder by the security forces that
he praises for their ``valiant services,'' from the moment that
he took over the role of ``bag man'' for the military, in the
appropriate phrase of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs---or as
the media prefer, the role of ``centrist-leftist'' (James
LeMoyne),{note: _NYT_, Nov. 24, 1987.} valiantly crusading for
democracy and social justice.

Expressing its utter contempt for the Guatemala accords, the
Duarte government passed an amnesty lauded by the _New York
Times_ as its ``most concrete step toward complying with the
regional peace accord'' since Duarte has now ``released almost
all political prisoners,'' a step contrasted with the refusal of
the Sandinistas to comply apart from ``tentative'' and grudging
steps.{note: Lindsey Gruson, James LeMoyne, Elaine Sciolino, Oct.
29; LeMoyne, Nov. 29, 1987.} The amnesty, bitterly opposed by
human rights groups, labor and the church, eliminated the remote
possibility of any punishment for the murderers and torturers who
conducted the terror that demolished the popular organizations,
destroyed the independent media, wiped out the political
opposition, killed thousands of union activists, and effectively
traumatized the population in the U.S. crusade to eliminate the
threat of democracy and social reform.  In Canada's leading
journal, it is described as ``an amnesty for the military and the
death squads'' in an article headlined ``Duarte ceasefire
designed to fail, diplomats say''{note: Chris Norton, _Toronto
Globe & Mail_, Nov. 5, 1987.}; in Canada the Party Line is more
difficult to enforce.  As for the incidental release of hundreds
of political prisoners, the chief of staff of Costa Rica's
Foreign Ministry, Luis Solis, observed that the amnesty would put
them at the mercy of the death squads, who are ``probably hiring
people to go out and shoot at the ones who are going to be
released,'' quite secure that they will be protected for their
crimes.  The _Washington Post_ notes in passing that ``90 percent
of the approximately 1,000 political prisoners in El Salvador had
been in custody for more than four years without a trial,'' and
that many fear their release to the mercy of the death
squads.{note: William Branigin, _WP_, Nov. 2, 1987.} The
Guatemalan military had declared a similar amnesty, for
themselves, as they permitted a civilian government to operate
under their control so as to obtain U.S. funds to rescue the
country from the economic chaos they had created while conducting
mass slaughter with enthusiastic U.S. support.

Meanwhile moralists here ponder the dilemmas of the ``moderate
center'' concocted for their benefit by the State Department
Office of Public Diplomacy, which has the task of controlling
what high Reagan administration officials describe as ``enemy
territory,'' that is, the domestic population.

To appreciate just how extreme was the Salvadoran gesture of
contempt for the accords, we can return to the irrelevant facts.
The accords call for amnesty decrees ``setting out all the steps
to guarantee the inviolability of all forms of life and liberty,
material goods and the safety of the people to benefit from said
decrees''---exactly what is declared unthinkable by the Duarte
government as it declares amnesty for the killers and torturers
to the admiring applause of the Free Press.

While in the United States, Duarte is lauded for courageously
leading El Salvador to ``democracy,'' the reaction at home is
different.  Public opinion polls conducted by the Central America
University in El Salvador in early 1987 reveal that half the
population ``think that nothing has changed'' under Duarte, 18%
think that the situation has deteriorated, and a rousing 10%
agree with the U.S. media that ``there is a process of democracy
and freedom in the country at present.'' On a visit to Holland in
October 1987, Duarte was criticized for human rights abuses while
officials privately expressed unhappiness about the visit, taken
at his initiative.{note: _CSM_, Oct. 20, 1987.} In Latin America,
the reaction is harsher.  On a trip to Uruguay, Argentina and
Brazil, Duarte was bitterly denounced by Christian Democratic
leaders and others and refused permission to address the General
Assembly in Uruguay, while in Argentina half the delegates left
the chamber as he spoke and in Brazil, fewer than 10% of the
members attended and he was greeted with angry demonstrations and
accusations of being a genocidal murderer.  In the Free Press,
one will find little mention of how our hero is perceived in
countries that have had some experience with U.S.-backed killers.

In the second of the terror states, the situation is hardly
different.  Americas Watch reports 25 new ``disappearances'' and
kidnappings in August 1987, in addition to 74 killings reported
in the press, an unknown number being political assassinations.
The Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, based in Mexico for
obvious reasons, reported 572 extrajudicial executions and 142
``disappearances'' from mid-January to March 1987.  Other sources
estimate about 50 political assassinations a month in 1987.
Nineth de Garcia, Guatemala's leading human rights activist,
reported in late November, for the benefit of the Canadian
reader, that ``the level of political kidnapping and murder is on
the increase'' since the accords were signed.{note: Guatemala
City; _Globe and Mail_, Nov. 25, 1987.} As in El Salvador and
Honduras, the poor are press-ganged into military service while
the rich are exempt, and general poverty and misery mount while
the wealthy enjoy the benefits of efficient state terror.  In all
three countries, the military remain firmly in command, serving
the interests of U.S. investors, the local oligarchy, and in El
Salvador, the new elites who are riding Duarte's coattails for
their share in corruption and robbery.  In short, ``democracy,''
American-style.

The rule of the military in the U.S.-backed terror states is
illustrated by their complete immunity from prosecution for
crimes that merit comparison to Pol Pot.  All of this is
acceptable, even described as ``democracy,'' in the terrorist
superpower that has directed and supported the necessary purge of
the societies.  Honduras differs primarily in that the repression
has been less bloody, or to be more accurate, more indirect:
starvation and slow, cruel death rather than torture, rape,
murder and mutilation.  I put aside Costa Rica, also now
dependent on U.S. aid for survival, though a serious inquiry into
the provisions of the accord for ``justice, freedom and
democracy'' and access by ``all ideological groups'' to the media
(a virtual monopoly of the ultra-right) would reveal that their
terms are far from realized here, despite much sanctimonious
rhetoric.

The conclusion, then, is that in the U.S. client states of
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, there is no possibility
that the accords will be implemented.  The Guatemalan _Central
America Report_ observes that ``of the five Central American
countries, the Nicaraguans have by far done the most to meet the
requirements of the Guatemala Plan, and in some cases have made
conciliatory gestures not indicated in the plan,'' citing
examples.{note: _CAR_, 16 October, 1987.} Here, no one discusses
the matter, because all of this is off the agenda according to
Washington orders, along with the even more serious U.S. actions
to undermine the accords.  From the first days after the accords
were signed, the media assured us that whatever may appear in the
irrelevant text, ``there is no doubt that [the treaty's] main
provisions are principally directed at Nicaragua and will affect
Nicaragua more than any of the other nations that signed the
accord''---which is certainly true, under the conditions of
obedience dictated by Washington, though this was presumably not
the point intended by James LeMoyne.  As he explained further,
the Sandinistas are ``in a somewhat exposed position'' because
they, and they alone, ``are under close scrutiny for their
efforts to carry out the Central American peace treaty''---as
dictated by Washington, whose orders are naturally binding.{note:
_NYT_, Nov.  10, 1987.} _Times_ correspondent Stephen Kinzer
informed us that the peace accord ``requires Nicaragua to permit
full press and political freedom'' while requiring ``other
countries in the region to stop supporting'' the contras; a
half-truth that amounts to a lie, since the accord also requires
the other states to permit full press and political freedom,
which is inconceivable as long as the security forces are not
dismantled and the U.S. remains in command.

I do not mean to suggest that Kinzer is incapable of outright
falsehoods, for example, his statement in the same column that
the Nicaraguan government refused to allow the ``Roman Catholic
radio station to broadcast news.'' This is one of his favorite
tales, repeated in several other columns and by LeMoyne as
well,{note: LeMoyne, Nov. 5, 1987.} along with the claim that the
Ministry of Interior refused to comment on the matter (Oct. 20).
AP reported the same day the statement of the Interior Ministry
that ``Radio Catolica may broadcast news, but must apply for the
legally required permission for the program and register the name
of its director, the broadcast time and other information''---not
exactly a decisive proof that this is a totalitarian dungeon.

These and other commentators surely understand that even if
Nicaragua is willing to overlook the fact that by orders from
Washington, the terms of the accord are inapplicable to the U.S.
client states, as of course to itself, still Nicaragua can hardly
relax its guard as long as the U.S. persists in its outspoken
commitment to overthrow the government by violence.  Perhaps it
is for this reason that the _Times_ does not report such matters
as CIA-run supply flights to the proxy army, the attempts to
bribe Miskito Indian leaders, or Operation ``Blazing Trail 1987''
and other U.S. measures to ensure that Nicaragua will be
compelled to maintain a state of permanent mobilization against
the threat of outright U.S. invasion.  In the West, threatening
military maneuvers are regarded as tantamount to aggression,
justifying a pre-emptive strike in response.  Thus when Arab
armies deployed in May 1967, the Israeli attack in response was
considered quite legitimate: how can Israel be expected to
sustain a mobilization for more than a few days? Israel was not
an impoverished country under attack by a terrorist superpower,
but when the U.S. carries out regular military maneuvers on
Nicaragua's borders along with overflights, naval operations
nearby, even the deployment of 50,000 troops designed to draw the
army away from population defense so as to facilitate the attack
against ``soft targets'' by U.S.-run terrorists, there is not a
word of protest in elite circles---apart from protest over
Nicaragua's unconscionable attempt to arm itself in self-defense.
These facts too provide us with some insight into our political
culture.

Let us put aside any further discussion of the irrelevant facts
and turn to the world of illusion constructed by Washington.
That is, we now turn to the Orwellian version of the
accords---the operative version, given the realities of power.


The Operative Illusions

According to the U.S. version, the sole question is whether the
accords will be implemented by Nicaragua---according to the
standards set by Washington.  These standards were readily
predictable from the start.  Since Washington is determined to
undermine the agreements, any respect in which Nicaragua adheres
to them is off the agenda.  We are permitted to discuss some
element of the accords only if Washington's interpretation
differs from Nicaragua's, so that Nicaragua is in violation---by
definition.  The task of the media, then, is to conduct a parody
of the sciences.  In the sciences, one confronts some puzzling
facts and attempts to devise principles that will explain them.
In ideological warfare, one begins with Higher Truths dictated
from above.  The task is to select the facts, or to invent them,
in such a way as to render the required conclusions not too
transparently absurd---at least for properly disciplined minds.

Accordingly the media, and respectable opinion generally, quickly
reduced the Central American agreements to ``two key points,'' as
Stephen Kinzer explained: (1) Will Nicaragua agree to negotiate
with the contras---that is, with the civilian directorate
established by the CIA as a classic Communist-style front? (2)
Will Nicaragua offer an amnesty to what are called ``political
prisoners,'' including National Guardsmen arrested---but not
killed, as is the norm elsewhere under such circumstances---after
they had taken part in the slaughter of some 40,000 people?

The accords say nothing about these matters, but that is further
irrelevant fact.  Specifically, the accords do not call for
discussions with CIA-created front organizations.  That the
contra directorate is exactly that has long been known, and has
recently been documented in detail in a monograph by Edgar
Chamorro, who was selected by the CIA to serve as spokesman for
the front created as part of the disinformation campaign designed
by the State Department for ``enemy territory'' at home
(_Packaging the Contras_, Institute for Media Analysis).  Robert
Owen, Oliver North's liaison with the contras, described the
civilian front as ``a name only,'' ``a creation of the United
States government (USG) to garner support from Congress''; power
lies in the hands of the Somozist-run FDN headed by Adolfo
Calero, who ``is a creation of the USG and so he is the horse we
chose to ride,'' though he is surrounded by people who are
``liars and greed- and power-motivated'' for whom the war is ``a
business'' as they hope for the marines to restore them to the
power they lost.{note: _Harper's_, October 1987; memo released at
the Iran-contra hearings.} Washington, with the docile media in
tow, focuses on the issue of negotiations with its creation as
part of the effort to establish the fiction that the proxy army
is an indigenous guerrilla force, comparable to the guerrillas in
El Salvador who were driven to the hills by U.S.-backed state
terror, have always fought within their country, receive little
if any military aid from abroad, have nothing like the
extraordinary intelligence and support system provided by the
terrorist superpower, and face a military force far more powerful
than the army of Nicaragua.  Notice further that negotiation of a
cease-fire with authentic guerrilla forces is hardly likely to
succeed, as the show negotiations in El Salvador and Guatemala
illustrate, and in the case of Washington's proxies, the U.S. can
readily disrupt any progress.  The issue, then, is marginal, as
compared with such crucial matters as Washington's unlawful use
of force and state terror in the client states.  But naturally
Washington will seek to restrict attention to this issue, and
commentary here has obeyed, including the doves.

As for amnesty, as we have seen, El Salvador acted at once to
violate this directive in the most blatant fashion, as Guatemala
had already done when the military declared amnesty for itself.
Nicaragua had an amnesty decree that approximates the stated
conditions of the accord, apart from the state of siege, which
Nicaragua has announced will remain in force until the U.S. war
is brought to a halt, a position that we would accept as
legitimate in the case of any client state, or the United States
itself if it were under attack or threat.  It was also accepted
as legitimate by the Verification Commission made up of the
foreign ministers of 13 Latin American nations including the five
Central American countries.  In their November 8 report, they
agreed that Nicaragua's amnesty may legitimately remain
conditional on termination of aid to the contras and use of
foreign territory to attack Nicaragua.  A senior Latin American
diplomat commented: ``Nicaragua does not have to implement
amnesty until Honduras kicks out the contras and the Americans
stop helping them.'' Rephrasing the facts in official _Times_
Newspeak: under the provisions of the accords, ``no country in
the region would be permitted to assist the contras once the
Sandinistas establish full political freedom'' (Stephen
Kinzer).{note: Reuters, _NYT_, Nov. 9; Kinzer, _NYT_, Nov. 18,
1987.}

The accords charge the Verification Commission with the
responsibility ``to verify and monitor the commitments contained
in this document.'' But this is unacceptable to Washington,
because the Commission is less subject to U.S. influence than the
Central American client states, who therefore must be assigned
the role of monitors.  For the same reason, a Contadora agreement
was completely unacceptable to Washington, whereas a Central
American agreement could barely be tolerated.  The more fanatic
contra lobbyists go so far as to inform us that the devious
Ortega ``tipped his hand'' at the OAS when he said that ``it is
up to the International Verification and Monitoring Commission
. . . to determine who is complying with the Guatemala accords,''
exactly as the text says, instead of the Central American
presidents, as Washington would prefer given its power over them
(Robert Leiken); note how brazenly Ortega defies Washington
orders.  More subtle apologists report that ``the decision'' over
``the accord's fate'' lies in the hands of ``the two
superpowers'' and their respective clients, thus adopting the
framework of cold war confrontation demanded by Washington (James
LeMoyne).{note: Leiken, _New Republic_, Dec. 14, 1987; LeMoyne,
_NYT_, Nov. 29, 1987.}

The Nicaraguan amnesty was extended after the accords, including
about 1000 prisoners, but few National Guardsmen.  The press,
following Washington directives, speaks of eight to ten thousand
``political prisoners,'' but Americas Watch, in a detailed
review, demonstrates that the figures are largely fabricated, and
that these are not ``political prisoners'' in the sense used in
the West; its February 1987 report lists _two_ political
prisoners in this sense, one since released.  Reviewing the
records of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and its own
investigations, Americas Watch estimated that apart from common
criminals (including 600 members of the army and police sentenced
for crimes against the population, a possibility unimaginable in
the terror states), the prisons contained about 2200 National
Guardsmen and 1500 people charged with security-related crimes.
The report is worth reading for its critical assessment of these
matters, but that is the real world, not the Orwellian world of
Washington and its minions.

In the latter world, along with numerous other fantasies, Robert
Leiken states that ``figures on Nicaraguan political prisoners
. . . range from a low of 4,300 (Americas Watch and the Nicaraguan
government)'' to the much higher claims that he has
relayed.{note: _New Republic_, Dec. 14.  Among other examples, we
might note Leiken's triumphant claim that ``the _contras_
released their Sandinista prisoners,'' referring to the release
of 80 ``Nicaraguan prisoners of war'' on September 18, also
hailed by the Free Press, which reported happily that most chose
to stay in Costa Rica.  In Central America, however, ``the
speculation is that they may be disaffected contras or contras
who would rather be inside Costa Rica by November 7'' (_Central
America Report_, Guatemala City, Sept.  26); ``The symbolism of
the gesture was tainted somewhat after several of the prisoners
admitted to being contras and others said they had been denounced
as Sandinista infiltrators in the contra ranks and were
arrested'' (_Mesoamerica_, San Jose, Costa Rica), Oct. 1987.}
Putting aside the interesting reading of the Americas Watch
report, note the none-too-subtle juxtaposition of Americas Watch
and the Nicaraguan government, in obedience to Washington's
longstanding attempts to undermine authentic human rights
organizations.

The _New York Times_ review of the progress of the accords after
the ``historic deadline'' of November 7{note: James Clarity,
_NYT_, Nov. 1.} conforms precisely to the dictates of the Office
of Public Diplomacy.  In the survey article of November 8 by
James LeMoyne, the behavior of the United States is unmentioned
and nothing is said about its client states.  The article focuses
on one issue: the Sandinista decision to enter negotiations with
the CIA civilian front, with Cardinal Obando---their most
prominent antagonist---as intermediary; a remarkable choice,
since only a neutral party is considered an appropriate
``intermediary'' apart from the Orwellian world established by
reigning power, and a hazardous move, since Obando can be
expected to blame the Sandinistas if the negotations collapse, as
elsewhere.  This decision, LeMoyne explains, is a great victory
for the United States, because its creation thus gains the status
of ``a legitimate belligerent force.'' The implication, drawn
explicitly by administration officials the same day, is that
``we've learned from this . . . that pressure works, and that we
must keep that pressure on.''{note: Pamela Constable, _BG_, Nov.
8, 1987.} The truth of the matter is that pressure works to keep
the media in line, though this victory is only a shade less
difficult than the glorious conquest of Grenada.

Accompanying LeMoyne's agitprop is a photograph of a rally in
Managua with this caption: ``Nicaraguans cheering President
Daniel Ortega Saavedra as he announced that his Sandinista
Government would agree to indirect negotiations with the contras
on a cease-fire.'' The reader is to understand, then, that the
people of Nicaragua are overjoyed over this contra victory, in
accord with _Times_ doctrine.  In the forefront of the photo is a
cheering woman wearing an FSLN (Sandinista) T-shirt.  There are
three signs visible.  One states that ``the others should
comply,'' since Nicaragua had already complied with the accords.
A second reads: ``Popular power cannot be discussed after 26
years of [the people's] struggle,'' a familiar Sandinista slogan.
The third, not entirely readable, apparently calls for closing of
_La Prensa_.  Not precisely what the _Times_ is laboring to
convey.{note: Peter Ford reports from Managua that ``the tens of
thousands of Sandinista supporters in Revolution square offered
no response when the President announced . . . talks with the
contra leadership,'' and other steps highly touted here were
``met with a baffled silence,'' though his defiant challenge to
``aggression against the Nicaraguan people'' received
``enthusiastic applause''; _CSM_, Nov. 9, 1987.}

It would be an error to describe such media subservience as
totalitarianism in the Stalinist or Nazi style.  In totalitarian
states, those who serve power have the excuse of fear.  Here we
see, rather, a form of voluntary servitude, a remarkable and
pervasive feature of the intellectual culture.

For its first commentary on the initial three-month phase of the
accords, the _Times_ selected James Chace, a noted dove.
Accordingly, he expressed pleasure with the progress on all
fronts, even Nicaragua, where President Ortega ``has agreed to
negotiate indirectly with the contras,'' thus indicating that at
last ``the Sandinistas seem determined to fulfill the main
provisions'' of the agreement, as defined by Washington.  But
``there is still, of course, a long way to go'' in consummating
the accords, because ``the Sandinistas have not yet declared a
general amnesty or lifted the state of emergency.'' Apart from
continued Sandinista obstruction, Chace sees no problems during
the three-month period, though as a dove, he opposes renewed
contra aid and criticizes the Reagan administration for remaining
``suspicious and hostile,'' while conceding that it has good
grounds, since ``the Guatemala agreement does not provide for
reductions in Soviet aid to Managua'' so that ``America's
legitimate security concerns'' are not addressed.  Among the
topics unmentioned are: U.S. actions to undermine the accords;
the violation of their essential provisions by the U.S. client
states; the fact that ``Soviet aid to Managua'' was a major
achievement of the Reagan administration, which blocked aid from
elsewhere while launching an attack on Nicaragua, and that the
Guatemala agreement also does not provide for reductions in U.S.
aid to its client states; that others, besides the beleaguered
and helpless United States, have ``legitimate security
concerns,'' among them Nicaragua and the victims of U.S. aid in
the terror states; that Managua has long offered to exclude
foreign advisers and negotiate verifiable security guarantees,
efforts successfully blocked by Washington; that if Nicaragua
poses ``security concerns'' for the United States, then
Luxembourg poses security concerns for the Soviet Union, and
Denmark, a member of a hostile military alliance, poses far
greater concerns, so that the USSR is entitled, by our
principles, to organize terrorist forces to attack and overthrow
their governments unless they agree to disarm and offer
verifiable guarantees that they will no longer threaten the
Soviet Union.  In short, the very model of a well-behaved dove,
as designed by the Office of Public Diplomacy.{note: James Chace,
_NYT_, Nov. 9, 1987.}

As always, it is the duty of the liberal doves to set the limits
of thinkable thought.  This has always been the essence of the
American system of indoctrination, brilliantly effective among
the educated classes, though ``enemy territory'' remains out of
control, a continuing problem.

Putting irrelevant fact aside, the operative question today is
whether Washington can convert the ``key issues'' it designates
into a justification for expanding the war against Nicaragua.
The problem that arose after Nicaragua's offer to negotiate with
the CIA civilian front can surely be overcome by U.S. propaganda
and military operations.  As we have seen, the latter were
immediately escalated in accord with the dedication of the
terrorist superpower to the unlawful use of force, with the
compliance of the doves, who loyally evade this unwelcome issue.
Washington has also attempted in other ways to elicit a hostile
Nicaraguan response that might be utilized by the State
Department Office of Public Diplomacy in its struggles in ``enemy
territory'' at home.  The Reagan administration sent Secretary of
Education William Bennett, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and assorted contra
supporters (David Horowitz, Ronald Radosh, etc.) to Nicaragua,
where they delivered inflammatory public addresses denouncing the
Sandinistas and praising the U.S. proxy army attacking Nicaragua,
prominently reported in the press (with approval, in _La
Prensa_).  But unfortunately, these efforts elicited no reaction
that could be exploited for propaganda purposes.

We might, incidentally, ask what would happen if a Libyan
official or Qaddafi enthusiast were to arrive in Tel Aviv to
deliver a public address praising Abu Nidal.  Or suppose a
Japanese cabinet minister had landed in Washington in 1942 (when
the national territory was not under attack or even threat---in
fact, it had not been threatened since the War of 1812) to
deliver diatribes about American racism and injustice and to call
for the forceful overthrow of the government by the ``freedom
fighters'' then liberating the Philippines and other Western
colonies.  We need not speculate, since as distinct from
totalitarian Nicaragua, Israel and the United States would never
tolerate any such act for one instant.  In fact, the U.S. has
barred even anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan legislators who are
opposed to contra aid, mothers tortured by Duarte's security
services who were invited by NOW to speak in New England towns, a
delegate from the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission to a UN
session on disarmament and development that the U.S. boycotted,
among many others---for example, the Canadian publisher of
several of my books, still barred from our sacred soil because he
opposed U.S. aggression in Indochina.  All such matters are off
the agenda, and in our extraordinary imperial arrogance, we take
for granted that Nicaragua must tolerate the infantile antics and
vulgar abuse that are a Washington specialty, in a manner that no
other state would endure---surely not the U.S. or its allies.

The attack against Nicaragua and the programs of state terror to
suppress democracy and social reform in the client states reflect
an elite consensus.  That is why they are not discussed in any
minimally serious way.  The media will not expose what they know
to be true, and Congress will not constrain the terrorist
commanders as long as they seem to be succeeding in their tasks.
The fate of the Central American accords lies in the hands of the
domestic enemy of the state, the citizens in ``enemy territory''
at home.  As so often in the past, dissent, protest, pressures of
a wide variety that escape elite control can modify the calculus
of costs of planners, and offer a slight hope that Washington can
be compelled to permit at least some steps towards ``justice,
freedom and democracy'' within its domains.