% FROM THE NOAM CHOMSKY ARCHIVE
% http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:/usr/tp0x/chomsky.html
% ftp://ftp.cs.cmu.edu/user/cap/chomsky/
% Filename:    articles/chomsky.loot.post-gulf-peace
% Title:       Letter from Lexington (column)
% Author:      Noam Chomsky
% Appeared-in: Lies of Our Times (LOOT), May 1991
% Source:      aritza@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
% Keywords:    Israel, Baker, Shamir, Peres, peace process
% Synopsis:
% See-also:

Letter from Lexington

April 12, 1991

Dear LOOT,

``When this war is over,'' George Bush announced in January,
``the United States, its credibility and its reliability
restored, will have a key leadership role in helping to bring
peace to the rest of the Middle East'' (Andrew Rosenthal, ``Bush
Vows to Tackle Middle East Issues,'' _NYT_, Jan. 29, A13). With
the war over, James Baker flew at once to the region, meeting
with Israel and the Arab allies: the six family dictatorships
that manage Gulf oil production, the bloody tyrant who rules
Syria, and Egypt. In a ``watershed event,'' they ``endorsed
President Bush's broad framework for dealing with the Middle
East,'' Thomas Friedman reported (_NYT_, March 11).

Even critics were impressed. Anthony Lewis wrote that the
President is ``at the height of his powers'' and ``has made very
clear that he wants to breathe light into that hypothetical
creature, the Middle East peace process'' (_NYT_, March 15).
Helena Cobban found ``great inspiration'' in Bush's statement
that ``The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli
conflict,'' words ``spoken with commitment by an American
president at the height of his powers'' and forming part of his
``broad vision of Middle East peace-building'' (_Christian
Science Monitor_, March 12, p. 18). John Judis praised James
Baker as the hope for peace, a dove who ``has stood for
multilateral and diplomatic solutions'' and has ``emphasized that
the U.S. would have to work on resolving the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians'' (_In These Times_, Feb. 27).

The _New York Times_ editors saw ``a rare window for peace.''
``The P.L.O's Iraqi debacle . . . could bring forward acceptable
negotiating partners'' among the Palestinians, permitting
``direct bargaining between Israel and representative
Palestinians'' (March 11)---``representative'' being a code word
for ``acceptable to us.''  The _Washington Post_ agreed that
talks between Israel and the Arab states were preferable to an
``unprepared and unwieldy international conference,'' and offer
``the best way to make sure that the Palestinians, once they
locate representative and plausible spokesmen, will receive their
regional due'' (editorial, _WP weekly_, March 11--17). The _Wall
Street Journal_ announced that although ``Bush Hopes for a
Solution,'' ``the PLO's Leaders Must Want One as Well''
(headline, p. 1, March 6). The editors of the _Los Angeles Times_
admonished the Palestinians that they ``will have to do better
than'' Arafat, even if he is ``their sincere choice.'' They must
abandon the ``leadership that has habitually opted for
no-compromise dogmatism at the expense of conciliation,
frequently using assassination to silence moderate opposition
voices within Palestinian ranks'' (Feb. 26).  The next day,
Israel arrested yet another leading Arab advocate of
Palestinian-Arab dialogue, Dr. Mamdouh al-Aker, subjecting him to
torture as usual and keeping him from his attorney for a month
(_Mideast Mirror_, 27 March)---the real story about ``moderate
opposition voices'' for many years, regularly suppressed in favor
of convenient fictions, such as the ``no-compromise dogmatism''
of those who have been far closer to the international consensus
on a political settlement than Washington-media rejectionists for
15 years.

It did not pass without notice that a few problems remain. After
hailing the ``watershed event,'' Thomas Friedman added that ``The
Arab ministers clearly differed with Mr. Baker on one very
important detail: how to make peace with Israel.'' They called
for ``an international conference under the auspices of the
United Nations'' while ``Mr. Baker, by contrast, said an
international conference would not be appropriate at this time.''
``On secondary issues, such as the Palestinian-Israeli dispute,
[the Arab states] still prefer the safety of the Arab lowest
common denominator---at least for now.''

The official Arab statement after the ``watershed event'' reveals
another ``detail,'' recorded without comment (Excerpts, _NYT_,
March 12): the Arab allies ``demand the full and unconditional
implementation of Security Council Resolution 425'' of March
1978, the first of several calling for Israel's immediate
withdrawal from Lebanon. The plea was renewed by the government
of Lebanon in February 1991, ignored as usual while Israel and
its clients terrorize the region and bomb elsewhere at will (see
my ``Letter from Lexington,'' August 1990).

In the real world, the Arab allies have some company in calling
for an international conference. The matter arises regularly at
the UN, most recently in December 1990, when the call for such a
conference passed 144--2 (US, Israel). In the preceding session,
the Assembly had voted 151--3 (US, Israel, Dominica) for an
international conference to realize the terms of UN Resolution
242, along with ``the right to self-determination'' for the
Palestinians (UN Draft A/44/L.51, 6 Dec. 1989). A Security
Council resolution in similar terms had been offered by Syria,
Jordan, and Egypt as far back as January 1976 with the support of
the PLO and indeed initiated by it according to Israel. It was
vetoed by the US. Europe, the USSR, the Arab states, and the
world generally have been united for years on such a political
settlement, but the US will not permit it. The facts are
unacceptable, thus eliminated from history.

For twenty years, the US has backed Israeli rejectionism. For
that clear but inexpressible reason, the peace process remains a
``hypothetical creature.'' There is one simple reason why an
international conference is ``unwieldy'': participants will
support ``the right to self-determination'' for the indigenous
population.

Friedman observed further that Washington is exploring the idea

[text is missing here---JBE]

event' '' hosted by the US and USSR. Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir would find this preferable to an ``open-ended,
gang-up-on-Israel international conference'' (_NYT_, March 28,
A6).  Judis detected Baker's benign hand in this move towards
peace.

In the real world, Washington is willing to allow the Soviet
Union to co-host a ceremonial ``event'' on the assumption that in
its current straits, it will follow orders. But as Kissinger
warned years ago, Europe and Japan must be kept out of the
diplomacy; they are too independent. The President of the
European Community and its official in charge of Middle East
affairs recently reiterated the EC position expressed in the UN
Resolutions, declaring that ``The outside powers should not let
Israel get off the hook once again''; Israel should withdraw from
Lebanon and the occupied territories, and reach a settlement with
Syria on the Syrian Golan Heights (annexed in defiance of a
Security Council resolution and a General Assembly vote of
149--1). But, they added, the EC would have no major role in the
diplomatic process, a US monopoly (Jacques Poos, Eberhard Rhein,
_Mideast Mirror_, 28 March).

In their own quaint way, the media acknowledge these realities.
The _New York Times_ has mentioned that the US is alone in the
world in endorsing Israel's Shamir plan. But ``the Soviet Union
has moved away from a policy of confrontation with the United
States and now indicates that it prefers partnership with
Washington in the diplomacy of the region,'' the _Times_ later
added hopefully under the headline ``Soviets Trying to Become
Team Player in Mideast.'' This ``shift away from confrontation''
brings the Soviet Union ``closer to the mainstream of Mideast
diplomacy'' (Joel Brinkley, _NYT_, Sept. 8, 1989; Alan Cowell,
_NYT_, Dec. 12, 1989). To translate from Newspeak: The Soviet
Union may join Washington off the spectrum of world opinion,
becoming a ``team player'' in ``the mainstream.'' ``The team'' is
the United States, ``the mainstream'' is the position occupied by
``the team,'' and the ``peace process'' is whatever ``the team''
is doing.

Since 1989, the official ``peace process'' has been the Baker
plan, which, as Baker announced loud and clear, is identical to
the Shamir plan, more accurately, the coalition plan of Israel's
two major political blocs, Labor and Likud. Palestinians will be
limited to discussing its modalities, with the PLO excluded. The
current pretense is that when ``The Palestinians supported Iraq
during the gulf war and endorsed its missile attacks on Israel,
Mr. Baker's response was to freeze the Palestine Liberation
Organization out of his talks'' (Friedman, _NYT_, April 14,
``Week in Review,'' 1). All of Baker's conditions were explicit
long before the gulf war.

The Baker-Shamir-Peres plan had three ``Basic Premises.'' First,
there can be no ``additional Palestinian state,'' Jordan already
being one; there is no issue of Palestinian self-determination,
whatever the foolish and irresponsible world may think. Second,
no PLO; Palestinians may not choose their own representatives.
Third, ``There will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria
and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of
the Government'' of Israel. The plan then calls for ``free
elections'' under Israeli military occupation with much of the
Palestinian leadership in prison. The outcome, as Israeli
officials have made clear, is that Palestinians may be allowed to
set local tax rates in Nablus and collect garbage in Ramallah.

Unlike US commentators, the semi-official Egyptian press finds
little ``inspiration'' in the Bush-Baker rhetoric. Any hopes
evaporated after Baker's March visit, when he underscored
traditional US rejectionism (_al-Ahram_, cited in _Mideast
Mirror_, 27 March). There were no grounds for optimism in the
first place, given that the great power that has long barred any
meaningful peace process has now established that ``what we say
goes,'' as the President put it a few days after ``staking out
the high ground.''

A central task of the educated classes is to fix clearly the
bounds of opinion. At one extreme, we have Yitzhak Shamir, who
holds that the ``land for peace'' formula of UN 242 has already
been satisfied. At the other, we have the opposition Labor Party,
which sees advantages for Israel in ``territorial compromise''
along the lines of Labor's Allon plan, leaving Israel in control
of the useful land and resources but without responsibility for
most of the Arab population. The US is an honest broker, merely
seeking peace and justice, trying to steer a path between ``the
conditions the Arab nations and Israel have put on their possible
participation in any peace conference'' (Friedman, _NYT_, April
13). The world is off the spectrum entirely.

One technique is to attribute to ``good Arabs'' positions held by
the Washington-media alliance. Thus in Friedman's version of
history, in Jerusalem in 1977 President Sadat ``offered the
Israeli people full peace in return for a full withdrawal from
the Sinai desert'' (_NYT_, April 14, ``Week in Review''). This
was Menahem Begin's position, while Sadat reiterated the
international consensus. And now, Friedman writes, ``The Arab
countries have been demanding that Israel commit itself to an
interpretation of 242 that leaves open the possibility of trading
land for peace'' (_NYT_, April 10, 1991). As he knows, they
reject this US-Israeli formula, joining the world in an
interpretation of 242 that calls for political settlement on the
internationally recognized (pre-June 1967) border. Palestinians
and authentic Israeli doves have commonly regarded the Labor-US
``territorial compromise'' variety of rejectionism as ``much
worse than the Likud's autonomy plan'' (Shmuel Toledano,
endorsing the observation of Palestinian moderate attorney Aziz
Shehadah, _Ha'aretz_, March 8, 1991). The reasons are well-known,
but must remain as deeply buried as the true history.

Washington's rejectionist stance must be adopted as the basis for
reporting and discussion, while its advocates are lauded as doves
who intend to breathe light on the problems of suffering
humanity. The US and Israel can then proceed with the policy
articulated in February 1989 by Defense Secretary Yitzhak Rabin
of the Labor Party, when he informed Peace Now leaders that the
US-PLO dialogue was only a means to divert attention while Israel
suppresses the Intifada by force. The Palestinians ``will be
broken,'' he assured them, reiterating the prediction of Israeli
Arabists 40 years earlier: the Palestinians will ``be crushed,''
will die or ``turn into human dust and the waste of society, and
join the most impoverished classes in the Arab countries.'' Or
they will leave, while Russian Jews, now barred from the US by
policies designed to deny them a free choice, flock to an
expanded Israel, leaving the diplomatic issues moot, as the
Baker-Shamir-Peres plan envisions.

New excuses will be devised for old policies, which will be
hailed as generous and forthcoming. Failure will be attributed to
the ``no-compromise dogmatism'' of the extremists who fail to
adapt to Washington's ``broad framework for dealing with the
Middle East,'' which is by definition right and just.

Sincerely,


Noam Chomsky