Ethnicity versus nationalism
Thomas Hylland Eriksen
Journal of Peace Research, vol. 28, no. 3, 1991
[Image] Abstract
About this site The aim of this article is to identify some conditions
for peaceful coexistence between the state and
[Image] populations in multi-cultural societies. Initially, the
concepts of ideology, nationalism and ethnicity are
Relational examined briefly. It is argued that a successful
index ideology, such as a nationalist or an ethnic one, must
simultaneously legitimize a social order, i.e. a power
[Image] structure, and provide a meaningful frame for the
articulation of important, perceived needs and wishes of
Thematic index its adherents. A few empirical cases are then
considered. These examples, ranging from the
[Image] multi-cultural island-states of Mauritius [treated at
greater length here] and Trinidad & Tobago [dealt with
Alphabetic in a different vein here] to the Saami (Lappish)
index minority situation in northern Norway, involve conflicts
between nation-states and ethnic groups, and between
[Image] different ethnic groups within the nation-state. Some
conflicts and the methods employed to resolve them, are
Recent compared. The uniqueness of nationalism as a modern,
abstract "binary" ideology of exclusion and inclusion,
and its powerful symbolic as well as practical aspects,
[Image] are stressed and contrasted with "segmentary" ethnic
ideologies. Finally, the article proposes a list of
World necessary conditions for the peaceful coexistence of
culturally diverse groups within the framework of a
modern nation-state.
The conclusion is that the main responsibility lies with
the state insofar as it possesses a monopoly of
political power and the legitimate use of force. State
policies should genuinely attempt to decentralize power
while at the same time recognizing the right of being
cultural distinctive, even in matters relevant for
political discourse. State nationalism should not be
symbolically linked with the collective identity of only
one of the populations.The culturally homogenizing
tendencies of nationalism must in other words be
counteracted through institutional arrangements which
secure some form of ethnic autonomy and encourage
cultural pluralism. The alternatives are violent
suppression and the enforced assimilation of culturally
distinctive groups.
1. Aims and concepts
Virtually every modern nation-state is to a greater or
lesser extent ethnically divided. This frequently
implies a potential for various forms of conflict - from
armed conflicts to autonomist movements and political
segregation along ethnic lines (see e.g. Horowitz, 1985;
Wallensteen et al., 1986, for overviews).
Two central aspects of the contemporary global situation
indicate that ethnic conflicts may be of increasing
relative importance. First, the East-West conflict is
presently on the wane. The recent changes in the global
political system both call the attention of scholars and
policy-makers to conflicts which cannot be understood
within the idiom of the Cold War, and further directly
stimulate the growth of a wide range of new ideological
movements in the former Eastern Bloc, many of them
drawing explicitly on nationalist and ethnic rhetoric.
Secondly, processes of modernization in the Third World
lead to ever more encompassing confrontations between
dominant nationalisms and other ideologies in many
countries.
Ethnic ideologies are at odds with dominant nationalist
ideologies, since the latter tend to promote cultural
similarity and wide-ranging integration of all the
inhabitants of the nation-state, regardless of their
ethnic membership. It can therefore be instructive to
contrast ethnic ideologies with nationalism in
contemporary nation-states. Through examples from
ethnically complex nation-states, the variable content
and social impact of such different ideologies are
explored. The purpose is to identify some conditions
under which culturally justified conflicts may arise
within modern nation-states,1 and to suggest conditions
for their resolution or avoidance. The general
perspective is from within; that is, ideologies and
practices are considered largely from the point of view
of their adherents. It will be argued, further, that the
multi-ethnic nation-state is no contradiction in terms -
that it may indeed be a viable and stable political
entity.
1.1. Ideology
The central concept of ideology is treated throughout as
a double concept. On the one hand, ideology serves to
legitimize a particular power structure and in this
respect conforms to a conventional marxist view. On the
other hand, ideologies necessarily derive their popular,
potentially mobilizing force from their ability to
organize and make sense of the immediate experiences of
their adherents; they cannot, therefore, be regarded
simply as forms of false consciousness2. The term
ideology can profitably be used in the plural insofar as
people evaluate available ideologies critically and
compare them through choosing their strategies and
practices. The final outcome of a competitive situation
involving two or several ideologies depends on their
respective persuasive power among their frequently
ambivalent audiences. It follows from this that an
analysis of particular ideologies, in this case
nationalist and ethnic ones, demands an understanding of
the lives of the followers of the ideologies in
question. An analysis of ideology cannot solely consider
the properties of the political system and the
ideational content of the ideologies themselves, since
beliefs and other forms of knowledge contribute to the
reproduction of society only to the extent that they are
embedded in interaction.
1.2. Nationalism and ethnicity
In its most basic sense, ethnicity refers to the social
reproduction of basic classificatory differences between
categories of people and to aspects of gain and loss in
social interaction. Ethnicity is fundamentally dual,
encompassing both aspects of meaning and of politics.
Ethnicity is, however, a concept which refers to a
multitude of socio-cultural phenomena. It may appear at
our doorstep any time and vanish in a matter of seconds:
for instance, my relationship with foreign students at
the university has ethnic connotations and can thus be
viewed as an ethnic relationship. They enter my office
and go away; the duration of such an ethnic relationship
can be less than half an hour. Similarly, my
Pakistani-Norwegian grocer enters my life to a very
limited degree, and the ethnic aspect of our
relationship is nearly negligible (although never
entirely absent). On the other hand, the term ethnicity
can also refer to large-scale, long-term political
processes such as the relationship between blacks in the
United States and the US nation-state; it can refer to
intricate trade networks throughout the United Kingdom
or to the religious sentiments of individuals; sometimes
ethnicity becomes nationalism historically, sometimes it
vanishes altogether, and so on. In a certain sense,
ethnicity is created by the analyst through the
questions she poses in her research. What makes
ethnicity a more interesting concept in the contexts
considered below than say, class, is its empirically
pervasive nature: Ethnicity can, if sufficiently
powerful, provide individuals with most of their social
statuses, and their entire cultural identity can be
couched in an ethnic idiom.
In social anthropology and urban sociology, ethnicity
has been analysed extensively at the level of
interpersonal action, at the level of the township, at
the level of factioning and riots, etc. In this
restricted context, I focus on ethnic phenomena which
involve nation-states directly or indirectly, and where
ethnicity is manifest through political organization3.
I will treat nationalism and ethnicity as ideologies
which stress the cultural similarity of their adherents.
By implication, nationalists and ethnicists will, in a
situation of conflict, stress cultural differences
vis-α-vis their adversaries.4 The distinction between
the two may therefore appear to be one of degree, not
one of kind - particularly since many political
movements are commonly perceived as being both
nationalist and ethnic in character. What to make, then,
of say, autonomist movements in Soviet Central Asia,
proclaiming Azeri or Armenian nations, insofar as their
official status is that of ethnic minority groups? The
difference, in this case, is in the eye of the beholder.
A self-proclaimed nationalist holds that state
boundaries should be identical with cultural boundaries
(see Gellner, 1983, for an excellent discussion of the
concept). If such claims are not acknowledged as
legitimate by the political authorities of the state in
which she resides, they will perceive her, and define
her, as an ethnic revivalist. In other words, the major
difference between ethnicity and nationalism lies, as
they are delineated here for convenience, in their
relationship to the state. Unsuccessful nationalisms
therefore tend to become transformed into ethnicities
whose members reside more or less uncomfortably under
the aegis of a state which they do not identify with
their own nationality or ethnic category. This has
happened to certain indigenous peoples of autonomist
persuasion, to many of the "one hundred and four
peoples" of the Soviet Union, and to some extent, to the
white minority of Zimbabwe, whose variety of nationalism
in the end lost the battle for political and cultural
hegemony.5 Many of the ethnics6 condemned to such a fate
eventually vanish through migration, extermination or
cultural assimilation. On the other hand, there are
ethnicities and ethnic movements whose ultimate aim is
not - and can never be - full statehood. Urban
minorities in Europe and North America are obvious
examples; such groups are in many respects integrated in
ways radically different from groups who claim
territorial rights. Finally, we need to distinguish
provisionally between those indigenous "Fourth World"
peoples favouring autonomy but not full statehood, and
those ethnic minorities (or nations without a
nation-state of their own) whose legitimized leaders or
spokespersons work for total political independence.
Ethnic minority situations are frequently ambiguous in
this regard. Greenlanders make up an ethnic category to
the extent that their destiny is intertwined with that
of metropolitan Denmark, but they constitute a potential
nation-state to the extent that they collectively vie
for full political autonomy. Their identity as
Greenlanders can therefore be regarded both as an ethnic
and as a national one, depending on the analytical
perspective. This contradiction is naturally manifest
also in the experience of many Greenlanders. The
widespread switching between ethnic and national
identities in Poland and other Central European
countries in the 1920s and '30s further exemplifies the
contextual character - and empirical interrelatedness -
of ethnicity and nationalism as popular ideologies (see
Neumann, 1990).
Nationalism entails the ideological justification of a
state, actual or potential. Judged on this criterion,
ethnicity can sometimes be interpreted as a form of
stagnant nationalism which may eventually, or
periodically, become manifest as nationalism.
The social importance, the "semantic density", of such
ideologies varies immensely historically,
geographically, contextually and situationally - both at
the level of the individual and at the level of the
political system. The mere fact that "nationalism exists
in country X" or "ethnic minority groups live in state
Y" does not necessarily imply that such ideologies play
an important part in the lives and/or political
processes encompassed by the system. The relative
importance of nationalism and ethnicity is an empirical
question, and the cases discussed below suggest the
circumstances under which they can assume importance.
2. Nationalism vs. ethnicity
Viewed geopolitically, nationalism is an ambiguous type
of ideology. It can be aggressive and expansionist -
within and outside of state boundaries; and it can serve
as a truly peacekeeping and culturally integrating force
in a nation-state or a region. Nationalism is frequently
regarded by liberal theorists as a universalist kind of
ideology emphasizing equality and human rights within
its polity, but it can just as plausibly be seen as a
kind of particularism denying non-citizens or culturally
deviant citizens full human rights and, in extreme
cases, even denying them membership in the community of
humans (see Giddens, 1987, pp. 177 ff. for a critical
discussion of these aspects of nationalism). Depending
on the social context, then, nationalism may have
socio-culturally integrating as well as disintegrating
effects; it sometimes serves to identify a large number
of people as outsiders, but it may also define an ever
increasing number of people as insiders and thereby
encourage social integration on a higher level than that
which is current. There is nothing natural or
historically inevitable in this. For the nation is an
invention and a recent one at that; to paraphrase
Anderson (1983), it is an imagined community; it is not
a natural phenomenon, despite the fact that the object
of every nationalism is to present a particular image of
society as natural. Nationalism is ever emergent and
must be defended and justified ideologically, perhaps
particularly in new states, where alternative modes of
social integration, usually on a lower systemic level,
remain immediately relevant to a large number of people.
The "multi-ethnic" or "plural" state is the rule rather
than the exception (Smith, 1981); however, cultural
plurality can evaporate historically, it can lead to the
formation of new nation-states, it can lead to conflict
between ethnics or between state and ethnic, or it can
be reconciled with nationhood and nationalism.
2.1. The emergence of nationalism
Historically, an important part played by nationalist
ideologies in many contemporary nation-states has been
to integrate an ever larger number of people culturally,
politically and economically. The French could not be
meaningfully described as a "people" before the French
revolution, which brought the Ile-de-France (Parisian)
language, notions of liberal political rights, uniform
primary education and not least, the self-consciousness
of being French, to remote areas - first to the local
bourgeoisies, later to the bulk of the population.
Similar large-scale processes took place in all European
countries during the 19th century, and the modern state,
as well as nationalist ideology, is historically and
logically linked with the spread of literacy (Goody,
1986), the quantification of time and the growth of
industrial capitalism. The model of the nation-state as
the supreme political unit has spread throughout the
20th century. Not least due to the increasing importance
of international relations (trade, warfare, etc.), the
nation-state has played an extremely important part in
the making of the contemporary world. Social integration
on a large scale through the imposition of a uniform
system of education, the introduction of universal
contractual wagework, standardization of language etc.,
is accordingly the explicit aim of nationalists in e.g.
contemporary Africa. It is, of course, possible to
achieve this end through contrasting the nation with a
different nation or a minority residing in the state,
which is then depicted as inferior or threatening. This
strategy for cohesion is extremely widespread and is not
a peculiar characteristic of the nation-state as such:
similar ideologies and practices are found in tribal
societies and among urban minorities alike. Insofar as
enemy projections are dealt with in the present context,
they are regarded as means to achieve internal, national
cohesion, since international conflicts are not
considered.
Nationalism as a mode of social organization represents
a qualitative leap from earlier forms of integration.
Within a national state, all men and women are citizens,
and they participate in a system of relationships where
they depend upon, and contribute to, the existence of a
vast number of individuals whom they will never know
personally. The main social distinction appears as that
between insiders and outsiders; between citizens and
non-citizens. The total system appears abstract and
impenetrable to the citizen, who must nevertheless trust
that it serves his needs. The seeming contradiction
between the individual's immediate concerns and the
large-scale machinations of the nation-state is bridged
through nationalist ideology proposing to accord each
individual citizen particular value. The ideology
simultaneously depicts the nation metaphorically as an
enormous system of blood relatives or as a religious
community, and as a benefactor satisfying immediate
needs (education, jobs, health, security, etc.). Through
this kind of ideological techniques, nationalism can
serve to open and close former boundaries of social
systems. Some become brothers metaphorically; others,
whose citizenship (and consequently, loyalty) is
dubitable, become outsiders. In Figure 1 below, the
peculiar communicational features of nationalism and the
nation-state are depicted crudely and juxtaposed with
the Gemeinschaft-like kinship or locality-based
organizations they seek to replace and imitate in their
symbolism. The major difference is that nationalism
communicates through impersonal media (written laws,
newspapers, mass meetings etc.) whereas kinship ideology
is communicated in face-to-face interaction. The former
presupposes the latter as a metaphoric model.
------------------------------
Fig. 1 about here -- sorry about this, but it seems to
have been lost during conversion. It will be inserted
when it has been excavated (-THE)
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Nationalism is ideally based on abstract norms, not on
personal loyalty. Viewed as a popular ideology,
nationalism is inextricably intertwined with the destiny
of the nation-state. Where the nation-state is
ideologically successful, its inhabitants become
nationalists; that is, their identities and ways of life
gradually grow compatible with the demands of the
nation-state and support its growth. Where nationalism
fails to convince, the state may use violence or the
threat of violence to prevent fission (that is, in the
modern world, the potential formation of new
nation-states on its former territory). The monopoly on
the use of legitimate violence is, together with its
monopoly of taxation, one of the most important
characteristics of the modern state; however, violence
is usually seen as a last resort. More common are
ideological strategies aiming to integrate hitherto
distinctive categories of people culturally. Since
national boundaries change historically, and since
nations can be seen as shifting collectivities of people
conceiving of their culture and history as shared, this
is an ongoing process. Ethnic groups can vanish through
annihilation or more commonly, through assimilation.
They may also continue to exist, and may pose a threat
to the dominant nationalism in two main ways, either as
agents of subversion (they do, after all, represent
alternative cultural idioms and values - this was how
the Jews of Nazi Germany were depicted) or as agents of
fission (which is evidently the case with Baltic
nationalists).
Nationalist strategies are truly successful only when
the state simultaneously increases its sphere of
influence, and responds credibly to popular demands. It
is tautologically true that if the nation-state and its
agencies can satisfy perceived needs in ways
acknowledged by the citizens, then its inhabitants
become nationalists. The main threats to national
integration are therefore alternative social
relationships which can also satisfy perceived needs.
There are potential conflicts between the nation-state
and non-state modes of organization, which may follow
normative principles incompatible with those represented
by the state. This kind of conflict is evident in every
country in the world, and it can be studied as
ideological conflict, provided ideology is not seen as a
system of ideas, but as sets of ideological practices.
Typical examples are African countries, where
"tribalism" or organization along ethnic lines is
perceived as a threat (by the nation-state), or as an
alternative (by the citizens), to the universalist
rhetoric and practices of nationalism. From the
citizen's point of view, nationalism may or may not be a
viable alternative to kinship or ethnic ideology (or
there may be two nationalisms to choose between, e.g. a
Soviet and a Lithuanian one) - and she will choose the
option best suited to satisfy her needs, be they of a
metaphysical, economic or political nature. The success
or failure of attempts at national integration must
therefore be studied not only at the level of political
strategies or systemic imperatives; it must equally be
understood at the level of the everyday life-world. In a
word, the ideological struggles and the intra-state
conflicts, as well as the context-specific options for
"the good life", shape and are simultaneously rooted in
the immediate experiences of its citizens, - and the
analysis must begin there.
2.2. Binary and segmentary ideologies
Nationalism, as the ideology of the modern nation-state,
ostensibly represents universalist norms domestically,
as opposed to particularist norms. A common type of
conflict entailed by this opposition occurs in the
labour markets of many countries. According to
kinship-based and ethnic ideologies of the kind
prevalent in many African countries, employment should
normally be provided by members of the extended lineage
(or the ethnic). According to nationalist ideology,
employment should be allocated democratically and
bureaucratically, according to formal qualifications,
regardless of the personal relationship between employer
and applicant. These contradicting norms pervade labour
markets in many parts of the world. The example further
indicates that an individual who perceives the
differences, will adhere to the ideology whose
implications are more beneficial to himself (see
Helle-Valle, 1989; Eriksen, 1988, for fuller
discussions). The general point to be made here is that
whenever nationalism is ideologically opposed to ethnic
and kinship ideology, it will strive to present itself
as just and fair according to abstract principles.
Whether or not it succeeds in this respect depends on
its ability to persuade people that it is beneficial to
themselves (in some respect or other) that they
subscribe to impartial justice of the kind represented
by the state.
Contradictions between abstract norms of justice and
concrete norms of loyalty occur in virtually every realm
of social life in modern nation-states. In most states,
variations on this theme form a central part of the
discourse on ideology; the question concerns which type
of social identity is relevant and ultimately, how the
social world is constituted (see Larsen, 1987). A
relevant question while considering different forms of
incorporation and integration in some modern states, is
therefore this: Under which circumstances are social
identities, specifically ethnic identities, made
relevant in conflicts in modern states, how do such
conflicts arise, and how can they be resolved?
The general answer to this question, as will be evident
from the examples and subsequent discussion, is that
such conflicts evolve when agents act according to
particularistic systems of segmentary oppositions, which
either contribute to inequality or are justified by
perceptions of inequality, and where invocations of
cultural differences can serve to account for such
strategies. Let me elaborate briefly. Segmentary
oppositions in social integration function according to
the general scheme first developed in Evans-Pritchard's
analysis of mechanisms for the articulation and solution
of conflicts among the Nuer of the Sudan (see
Evans-Pritchard, 1940, particularly chapter 4). The
general formula is: "It's I against my brother, my
brother and I against our cousins; my cousins, my
brother and myself against our more distant relatives,
etc." In a modern, multi-ethnic society, segmentary
oppositions could be expressed thus by a member of the
X'es in country N: "It's I against my family, my
extended lineage and myself against the rest of the
X'es; further, it's all of us X'es against the other
people and the state of N; but it's all of us citizens
of N against the people of the country M." The pattern
of competition and potential conflicts could be
envisaged as one consisting of concentric circles; the
general model is analog, for degrees of difference are
made relevant. Unlike the digital model advocated by
nationalism, dividing people into only two, mutually
exclusive categories (insiders and outsiders),
segmentary ideologies entail degrees of inside- and
outsideness.
Through its official policies, the state will normally
favour forms of organization incompatible with corporate
action along ethnic or lineage lines; its way of
classifying is different (digital or binary) and the
system of segmentary opposition suggested is therefore
incompatible with the organization of most
nation-states. On the other hand, the state may itself
represent a form of "lineage organization", if it is
controlled by a dominant ethnic.
One of the examples below describes a society where the
nation-state skilfully mediates between the two
conflicting principles of social organization.
2.3. Compromise and hegemony: Mauritius and Trinidad
Nowhere is the notion of the nation as an imagined
community more evidently true than in the colonially
created states. Commonly invoked as examples of this are
the new African nation-states (see e.g. Smith, 1983;
Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), whose boundaries were randomly
drawn a century ago, and whose nationalisms are of very
recent origin. Even more striking are the culturally
constructed nationalisms of societies which were never
pre-colonial. Mauritius and Trinidad & Tobago are
examples of such emergent nations. Both of these
island-states, one in the Indian Ocean, one in the
Caribbean, are ethnically heterogeneous and have always
been; the very societies were created through the mass
import of slaves and indentured labourers during the
modern era, and they have been independent less than
thirty years7. Until the 1960s, then, the wider
identities of the inhabitants of these islands were
colonial; the people knew that they were British
subjects and that, to some extent, they were ruled from
Britain.
Mauritius and Trinidad, demographically similar, have
followed different courses in creating their respective
nationalisms. Let us consider Mauritius first.
Mauritians are as a rule very conscious of problems
related to ethnic differences. Their society is made up
by groups originating from three continents and four
major religions; there is no clear majority, and yet,
the Mauritian nation-state has hitherto avoided
systematic inter-ethnic violence (the one notable
exception to this is the series of minor riots around
independence in 1967-8). Yet Mauritians are, regardless
of ethnic membership, determined to retain their ethnic
distinctiveness. Rituals celebrating particular
religions are widely attended, there is little
intermarriage between groups, and there is currently an
upsurge in popular interest in cultural origins: Hindi
courses are held for Indo-Mauritians who have never
learnt their ancestral tongue, Arabic is being
introduced as the language of the mosque, an
Organization of Afro-Mauritians was set up in the
mid-eighties, etc. Simultaneously, there are strong
"centrifugal" forces at work encouraging a Mauritian
nationalism which is identified with uniformity in
cultural practices: the emergent industrial system of
production demands uniformly qualified, mobile labour,
which in turn requires a standardization of education.
National radio, TV and newspapers increasingly influence
the form and topic of discourse about society, and the
political system takes little account of ethnic
differences. Although parties tend to be ethnically
based, their rhetoric is nationalistic, and public
political discourse is issue-oriented. The Mauritian
state, recognizing the immanent dangers of the potential
dominance of one ethnic, has taken great pains to
develop a set of national symbols which can be endorsed
by anybody, and which are thus not associated with one
particular ethnic.8 Caught between different, sometimes
conflicting ideological orientations, Mauritians choose
situationally between the universalist ethics of
nationalism, and the particularist ethics of ethnicity.
In matters relating to employment and marriage,
ethnicity is still a major variable, but it is
constantly counteracted by discourse proclaiming the
superiority of abstract justice and non-particularism.
The openness of Mauritian discourse, public and private
- in particular, the fact that ethnic conflicts and
cultural differences are acknowledged everywhere as
facts of social life, coupled with the absence of a
hegemonic ethnic - indicate the kind of inter-ethnic
compromise realized in Mauritius. Although there are
important contradictions between ideologies of ethnicity
and ideologies of nationalism at the level of individual
action, the contradictions are to a great extent
reconciled on the national political level, where
compromise, justice, equal rights and tolerance are
emphasized. Ethnically based systems of segmentary
oppositions are encouraged outside of the educational,
political and economic systems, where the virtues of
meritocracy are continuously stressed. Current economic
growth certainly contributes to accounting for the
stable political situation, but it is by no means
certain that recession would automatically lead to the
breakdown of the currently shared rules for inter-ethnic
relations. Processes of national integration stressing
the necessity of inter-ethnic compromise were evident
over a decade before the current economic boom, which
began in the mid-eighties. The ethnic equilibrium may be
fragile, but the political system has repeatedly proven
capable of coping with conflict.
Strategies of compromise, characteristic of Mauritian
society, are - as we are painfully aware - by no means
the inevitable outcome of ethnic plurality. In Trinidad,
ethnicity takes on a different meaning. Like in
Mauritius, ethnicity is important in many situations in
daily life as well as in politics, but it is not always
acknowledged as such. Strategies of playing down
ethnicity as a relevant topic are frequently employed in
public discourse; this kind of strategy is typical of
dominant groups in many societies. The symbolic content
of Trinidadian nationalism is a good example of this.
1956 may be said to have been the year when Trinidadian
nationalism emerged. For the first time, a
pro-independence nationalist political party (PNM;
People's National Movement) won the general elections.
What was the content of its nationalism? The main slogan
was Massa Day Done; a reasonable translation would be
"our era as colonial servants is over". Notions of
self-reliance and self-determination were in themselves
powerful official national symbols. To the average urban
Trinidadian, these ideas were extremely attractive, and
nationalism was a strong and intoxicating force in
Trinidadian public life throughout the sixties. But to
whom? Who were the Trinidadians whose community was
created imaginatively by the PNM leaders? Looking more
closely, we find several social schisms implicit in
Trinidadian nationalism, the most important of which
runs between blacks and Indians. The blacks are the
larger group (but only slightly larger than the
Indo-Trinidadian) and have held the political power
since before independence. Indians were politically and
economically marginal, largely confined to the
canefields. The towns were dominated by blacks; the
radio played black music, and the national heroes, the
calypsonians, were nearly invariably black or brown
Creoles. The core electorate of the PNM were the urban
black. So what to make of the part played by Indians in
early Trinidadian nationalism? - It is a fact that they
were for generations alienated from power and influence;
only since around 1960 have the majority of
Indo-Trinidadians taken part in the national project of
Trinidad & Tobago to the extent that they have received
compulsory elementary schooling and extensive career
opportunities in the national political and economic
system. During the last 20 years, and particularly
during the 1980s, there has been a strong wave of Indian
ethnic revitalization in Trinidad. Culturally
self-conscious Indians claim that Trinidadian
nationalism is a black ideology with which they cannot
identify without losing their identity as Indians. A
question frequently raised critically by blacks as a
reply to this accusation, has been whether it is
possible to be simultaneously Indian and Trinidadian.
Here it should be noted that it would be absurd to ask
whether it is possible to be simultaneously black and
Trinidadian, since black culture is identified with
national culture. In other words, the issue deals with
responses to state-monitored attempts at cultural
assimilation. Defining Indian culture as anti-national,
blacks confirm their own as that of the Trinidadian
nation. Less powerful than the blacks politically and in
public culture, but still a large category of people now
well integrated economically and politically, Indians
react partly through declaring their status as that of
an oppressed minority, partly through allowing
themselves to become assimilated, and partly through
arguing that their customs and notions, too, form part
of national Trinidadian culture. The latter line of
argument recalls the official policies of the Mauritian
state, where the desirability of cultural pluralism is
emphasized (provided it does not conflict with
bureaucratic and capitalistic values). In Trinidad, the
legitimacy of ethnic systems of segmentary oppositions
is rejected in official discourse, but there is also a
systematic inequality of power between ethnic groups.
Stressing an ideology of equality in an environment of
inequality is characteristic of dominant groups.9 The
unequal distribution of power thus seems to account for
the significant variations in the techniques used for
handling ethnic differences in Trinidad and Mauritius.
Trinidad and Mauritius were chosen as examples because
they are in many ways similar, yet display two very
different solutions to the problem of multiculturalism
versus nationalism. Both maintain ethnic peace on the
national level; neither has currently an ethnic problem
involving systematic physical violence, whether between
individuals or between state and individual.10 However,
the Trinidadian model structurally resembles that of
less successful multi-cultural societies. The United
States is an example of such a society, where all
citizens, regardless of race and religion, have the same
basic rights, but where rules of social mobility favour
some but not all, and where nationalism is identified
with cultural symbols of the hegemonic group. Thus,
blacks and Hispanics are disqualified in a way
structurally similar to that of Indians in Trinidad.
Ideologies of equality in this way serve to justify
inequality whenever they fail to account for cultural
differences. Additionally, the US nation contains - or
encapsulates - ethnic minorities whose cultural
distinctiveness is in important ways incompatible with
the requirements of national society. This is clearly
the case with Amerindian groups, who more obviously than
blacks and Hispanics suffer culturally from the
intrusion of nationalistically justified imperatives.
Participation in the capitalist economy, the schooling
system etc. may contradict important features of their
way of life. In the case of such groups, the problem is
not only one of inequal distribution of power; it is
perhaps chiefly a problem of cultural and political
autonomy. In this kind of state/ethnic relationship, the
powerless, "muted" group may demand the right to be
culturally different in confrontation with the state, in
a context of overwhelming power asymmetry.
We now turn to a description a conflict of this type,
which is nevertheless atypical - and therefore
interesting analytically - because this state is in
principle willing to take part in dialogue with the
minority.
2.4. Indigenous peoples and state penetration: The
example of northern Norway
The relationship between the Norwegian state and the
Saami (Lappish) minority in Northern Norway is complex,
and a brief outline of some aspects of the contemporary
relationship will have to suffice.
Since the start of the post-war wave of ethnic
revitalization among the Saami (roughly since the
1950s), the Saami organizations' demand for cultural and
political self-determination has grown in intensity. The
ethnic processes taking place in territories settled by
Saami are similar to nationalist movements. There is a
current resurgence in popular interest in the
recodification and glorification of their stigmatized
cultural tradition, and there has consequently been an
increasingly articulated dichotomization in interaction
with Norwegians and mainstream Norwegian culture and
society (Eidheim, 1971). These processes are similar to
those of the burgeoning Norwegian nationalism of the
mid-19th century (see ╪sterud, 1984). There is one major
difference, however, between indigenous rights groups
such as the Saami, and classical nationalist movements.
The Saami do not presently demand full sovereignty; they
do not intend to set up a Saami nation-state. Orienting
themselves towards international law, the Saami
nevertheless fight for self-determination in matters
considered vital to their survival as a culture-bearing
group. In this they have aims comparable to those of
indigenous groups in the Americas, in Australia and
elsewhere. This would have to include an
institutionalization of the relationship between the
state and themselves built on an official recognition of
their right to self-determination as an indigenous
people and a recognition of the state's duty to grant
these special rights.
A profound dilemma for the Saami movement, then, is
rooted in the rather paradoxical situation that the
state against which they fight for self-determination
must also, in the last instance, be accepted as an
ultimate guarantor for the very same rights that it
threatens. Norwegian policies vis-α-vis the Saami,
insofar as they have acknowledged the Saami as a
culturally distinctive minority, have until recently
focused on questions of juridical rights defined within
the national Norwegian idiom. The Saami movement was not
successful until it was able to present itself
effectively as the representative of a Fourth World
people and present its case in the idiom of
international law, although an institutionalized
division of power between the nation-state and the newly
elected Saami parliament (1989) is now emerging. Unlike
the situation in Mauritius and Trinidad, where
negotiation takes place in a shared idiom of discourse,
the State-Saami context is still one where there is not
always agreement regarding the very rules of the game
(see Eidheim, 1985, for a full discussion).
This dilemma goes to the core of a central problem of
nationalism: the nationalist tendency towards cultural
homogenization, and the accompanying tendency to frame
every political question in the state's legalistic,
bureaucratic form of discourse. This disqualifies
culturally distinctive groups from full participation,
and simultaneously promotes their assimilation. The
process taking part in the northernmost part of Europe
is an interesting one from this point of view, since the
state is here in principle sympathetically inclined to a
dialogue with a well articulated, culturally distinctive
group. The recent founding of an elected Saami
parliament (with limited power) may enable Saami to
articulate their political demands in their own terms.
Such an attempt may, however, be unsuccessful for two
reasons: First, the structure of the Saami parliament is
modelled on Norwegian political institutions - it
resembles a county council - which may result in an
internationalization of the form of Saami politics.
Secondly, the necessary discourse with the Norwegian
state must probably be kept within a Norwegian idiom
focussing on juridical rights and duties.
The ideological situation of contemporary Saami is a
difficult one. Simultaneously a Norwegian citizen and
member of the modern world on the one hand, and a member
of a cultural minority on the other, the average Saami
is faced with a number of difficult choices. He is
culturally and ideologically opposed to, and yet
economically and structurally dependent on, the
Norwegian state. It is relatively easy for Saami to
assimilate, to become Norwegian, and many do. This
should not be taken as an indication of Norwegian
nationalism among the indigenes - there is little in
their history and contemporary situation encouraging
such an ideology, - it should rather be seen as a
tangible indication of the division of power and
opportunities in a modern state society. Unless a truly
ingenious model of autonomy within the national state is
developed, the structural imperatives for Saami to
assimilate will probably work in favour of assimilation
in the long run, and the Saami ethnic may eventually
vanish. The dominant Norwegian nationalism will in that
case emerge victorious; not primarily as a belief
system, however, but as a power structure and a set of
unified, integrating political, economic and domestic
practices. Ethnically based systems of segmentary
oppositions (Saami values/principles against Norwegian
values/principles) will in this case be invalidated: if
they eventually cease to be relevant in all kinds of
interaction, then the Saami minority will have been been
fully assimilated.
On the other hand, if the principles of international
law concerning the rights of indigenous peoples are
fully acknowledged in the practices of the Norwegian
state, then the Saami may survive as a culture-bearing
group within the territory of the Norwegian state, which
may thereby avoid otherwise inevitable accusations of
cultural genocide.
It should be noted, finally, that the Saami movement
draws much of its legitimacy from political entities not
constituted by the state or by a system of states (such
as the UN or the Common Market), but from international
Fourth World organizations and informal networks, and
through transnational public support. Fourth World
politics thus serves as a countervailing influence -
however modest - to the state's monopoly of political
power in the contemporary world.
2.5. National attitudes to ethnic minorities
Ethnic minorities pose a problem to the national state
to the extent that they communicate their
distinctiveness in contexts where this distinctiveness
is incompatible with requirements of the nation-state,
notably those referring to formal equality and uniform
practices. The minorities, as is evident from the
example of the Saami, are faced with threats of more or
less enforced assimilation. The intensity of such
pressures to assimilate is generally linked to the
degree of modernization and the level of state
integration in national society. Where ethnic minorities
could formerly be ignored and left alone, they are, in
the modern world, defined from the outside as citizens
of the national state, and are thus given equal rights
by an administrative apparatus unable to - or at least
unwilling to - grant its subjects unequal rights on
grounds of cultural distinctiveness. Indigenes or other
ethnically distinctive populations may, too, serve as
negative symbols of the nation, in which case the
relationship is chiefly one of conflict or oppression,
not one of possible compromise. This was clearly the
case in Nazi Germany, where Germanness was defined in
contrast to the un-Germanness of Jews, Gypsies and Slavs
(and this still holds to some extent in modern Germany;
see Forsythe, 1989). On the other hand, ethnic minority
populations can also be used symbolically in an
apparently opposite way, as metaphors of the nation.
This seems to be the case in Australia, where
aboriginals "have become so close to the centre of
nationalist thought that they have suffered from it"
(Kapferer, 1988, p. 142). In emphasizing the purity and
ancientness of aboriginal society, official Australia
prevents their assimilation in a manner not dissimilar
from policies of apartheid; that is, they are given
differential treatment due to differences in culture (or
race). That Aboriginals are not treated as equals by the
Australian state is evident (Kapferer, ibid.), and
Australian prejudices against people of non-Northern
European descent indicate that Australian egalitarianism
applies only to those perceived as the same kind of
people(see Kapferer, 1988, pp. 183 ff.).
2.6. Autonomy or assimilation?
On the one hand, ethnic minorities may demand specific
rights because of their distinctive culture and way of
life. On the other hand, they may suffer systematic
discrimination if they are granted such rights by the
state. South African apartheid is an even more obvious
example of this than the Australian policies vis-α-vis
Aboriginals. When the "Bantustans" or "homelands" were
created, black South Africans were formally allowed to
refuse to contribute to the white economic system to
which they were, inextricably, structurally tied. The
teaching of African languages among blacks has also been
encouraged in apartheid policy. This has enabled blacks
to retain parts of their cultural heritage, and it has
equally efficiently debarred them from political
participation in South African society.11 Their systems
of segmentary oppositions have been isolated from the
wider social context of which they potentially form
part.
It may seem, then, that neither solution is viable. If
all citizens are to be treated equally, then cultural
minorities are disqualified because their particular
skills are ignored. But if citizens are treated
unequally on the basis of cultural difference, then
cultural minorities suffer discrimination because they
lack certain rights granted the rest of the population.
It may seem, then, that ethnic minorities are bound to
lose any conceivable battle with the state.
The dilemma is easier to resolve - at least in theory -
than it may seem. If we consider the Trinidadian
situation again, the crucial factor in the cultural
predicament of Indo-Trinidadians clearly consists in the
official definition of nationalism. If Trinidadian
nationalism is to be defined as coterminous with black
culture, then Indians have to choose between evils, as
it were; either they assimilate and become "Creoles", or
they retain their Indianness at the risk of being
ostracized and disqualified. If the definition of
Trinidadianness on the contrary is extended to include
Hindus, and if India is officially recognized as an
ancestral Trinidadian land, then it may be possible to
be Indian and Trinidadian without more ado. Similarly,
multi-cultural nations such as Australia, the United
States and South Africa could conceivably extend the
idiom of nationalism to include non-white people,
creating compromises and tolerating differences in a
"Mauritian" fashion.
The more fundamental problem is, however, not yet
resolved. For nationalism, intimately linked with the
state and large-scale organization, entails specific
principles of social organization not necessarily
compatible with those of ethnic minorities. The success
of Mauritian nationalism seems to depend on the
containment of such differences to contexts where ethnic
segmentary oppositions do not interfere with the
principles of the state. Cultural minorities,
apparently, are thus forced to adapt to some of the
demands of the modern state in order to be able to
articulate their interests. This will to a greater or
lesser extent entail cultural change. If they refuse,
they run the risk of witnessing the purchase of their
ancestral land for a handful of coloured glass beads.
For the key variable in the understanding of
relationships between nations and ethnics is power. The
power invariably lies with the state, which officially
represents the nation, which possesses the monopoly of
legitimate violence, which contains the culturally
hegemonic group, - and which thereby defines the terms
of negotiation and the form of discourse. Powerless
groups must therefore learn to master the language of
the powerful, and in this process they may have to alter
their cultural identity substantially. This applies
equally to aboriginal populations and to urban
minorities, although emphases may differ; for one thing,
urban minorities, unlike many indigenes, usually engage
in wagework and in this conform to a central requirement
of nationalist ideology.
3. The justification of nationalism: Symbols, power,
integrating practices
In order to function successfully, nationalism must
legitimize the power of the state, and it must
simultaneously make the lives of citizens seem
inherently meaningful. The partial failure of Norwegian
nationalism to make sense to the Saami in this dual
fashion has led to negotiations, where the Norwegian
nation-state nevertheless sets the terms by ignoring and
tacitly disapproving of Saami identity and selfhood.
Indeed, in all the examples mentioned except that of
Mauritius, which is in this respect considered a
success, conflicts between nation-states and ethnics can
be understood along this dimension. If the state fails
to persuade its citizens that it represents the
realization of (some of) their dreams and aspirations,
then its power may appear illegitimate. The result may
be revolt, and in such cases the state may well resort
to violence. This is well known from many countries,
past and present. My point has been that there are also
powerful non-violent means available for the
nation-state to secure its monopoly of political power,
even if nationalist ideology fails. The most important
is the state's exclusive right to define the terms of
discourse, including its right to collect taxes. In well
integrated states, these terms of discourse take on the
form of doxa (Bourdieu, 1980); that is, they are
perceived as unquestionable. In states including groups
which are not integrated in the state through a shared
education, participation in the same economic system,
etc., this form of statal power is perceived as a form
of coercion; as enforced "acculturation", as it were.
The ideological power of nationalism is often (but not
always) expressed in the official identification of
enemies, and as has been noted many times by analysts,
warfare can serve as a nationally integrating force. Any
segmentary opposition (or other forms of conflict)
within the polity may be postponed and "forgotten" when
an external enemy encourages the realization of the
highest, unambiguously binary level of the system of
oppositions. The Falklands/ Malvinas war between Britain
and Argentina (1982) is a recent example of this
familiar mechanism, at least if seen from a British
point of view. Similarly, the identification and
prosecution of internal enemies has been a familiar
technique of integration for centuries. Contemporary
witchhunts include the Kenyan police-state's "internal
war" against the partly mythical opposition group
Mwakenya and, emerging from popular (not
state-monitored) nationalism, French nationalists'
designation of North Africans as the main threat to
Frenchness. In order to understand the persuasive power
of nationalism on the one hand, and its oppressive
aspects on the other, it must be conceded that
nationalism is, ultimately, a particularist form of
ideology: it defines cultural and social boundaries on
behalf of a community, and it excludes those who do not
fit in. I have argued that these boundaries are
flexible, but have also indicated that they are not
indefinitely so. Notably, nationalism - as the ideology
which holds that the boundaries of the state should be
coterminous with the boundaries of the cultural
community12 - requires cultural uniformity in certain
respects. Nationalism represents a simple binary
opposition (between citizens and non-citizens), whereas
other ideologies differentiate between people in
segmentary terms.
The state, which by the late 20th century necessarily
represents a successful nationalism (i.e., it is a
nation-state), possesses a monopoly of violence and has
exclusive rights to extract tribute in the form of
taxes. It is therefore in the immediate interest of a
successful nationalism to promote cultural homogeneity
as regards law and order, and economic activity.
Conflicts between pastoralists and the new states in
Africa typically exemplify this problem. Pastoralists do
not acknowledge the laws pertaining to private property
(nor, for that matter, national borders), and since
their economy is not chiefly a monetary one, they do not
contribute financially to the state. Therefore, they are
by definition anti-nationalists insofar as they reside
within the state which, as ideology has it, should be
coterminous with the cultural community. In a very
fundamental sense, then, every human being in the late
20th century is encouraged - or forced - to take on an
identity as a citizen. As indicated, those who do not
tend to lose. The battle between nationalist and ethnic
ideologies is most frequently won by the dominant
nationalism, which is already represented in the state.
However, as I have suggested, there are possible
compromises between the ideology of the nation-state and
ethnicity - even if the inherently aggressive
assimilating drive of state nationalism is acknowledged.
Let us therefore consider some conditions for the
resolution - or avoidance - of conflicts between state
nationalism and ethnicity.
4. Conditions for multi-cultural peace
Two main types of conflict involve nationalist ideology.
Many conflicts arise between states or potential states.
Every international conflict involving states - as well
as civil wars such as the one in Sri Lanka, where one
party fights for political secession - are varieties of
this kind of conflict. The ideologies activated are all
explicitly nationalist in character.
This discussion has focussed on the second type of
conflict. This kind of conflict unfolds within a state
where neither party favours political secession. Such
conflicts can involve the state and one or several
ethnics; ideologically, they are ambiguous as several of
the combatants may claim to represent universalism and
nationalism on behalf of all of the groups involved in
the conflict, notwithstanding that some other group may
(or may not) form the majority and/or be in charge of
the state administration. This category of conflicts is
the most complex, empirically and ideologically.
By way of conclusion, we can now indicate some necessary
(although not sufficient) conditions for the resolution
of types of conflicts involving categories of people
where their stressing mutual cultural differences forms
an important part of the ideological justification of
the conflict, and where the boundaries of the state are
not challenged. In other words, this is an attempt to
delineate conditions for peaceful cultural plurality
within a modern state.
4.1. Necessary conditions for peaceful multiculturalism
╖ Equal access to the educational system, the labour
market and/or other shared facilities should be deemed
as desirable. This must also entail the right to be
different, the right not to participate in national
society in certain respects, the right to enact systems
of segmentary oppositions not sanctioned by the state.
The judiciary system will normally limit the extent of
the articulation of such differences. Laws are
changeable.
╖ National identity should be available to all citizens
regardless of their cultural differences.
╖ State policies pertaining to multiculturalism should
take account of possible culturally contingent
differences in their definitions of situations.
╖ By implication, the state cannot be identified with a
set of symbols exclusively representing one or a few
component populations.
╖ Political power should be decentralized, and different
principles for local political organization should be
accepted.
Differences between nation-states as regards modes of
integration, political systems and economic
circumstances are enormous. Since I have throughout this
article treated the nation-state as an analytical
concept, I am now compelled to mention some of the
relevant differences between actual, historically
situated nation-states.
First, the differences in degree of incorporation within
the state are crucial. For instance, many African and
Melanesian societies are hardly at all integrated on a
national level; their members hardly participate in
national society. The problems discussed in this article
do not apply to them yet (although they are faced with
different problems).
Secondly, the degree of cultural uniformity within
nation-states varies. Even in Mauritius, where the
absence of cultural uniformity seems to have been turned
into a blessing for nationalism, cultural homogeneity is
very high in important respects; there is consensus as
regards the political system, there is uniform
participation in the educational system as well as the
capitalist economy. Conflicts between state and ethnic
are more difficult to resolve when representatives of
the ethnic demand participation on their own terms,
which need not be those of the nation-state.
Thirdly, it is empirically significant whether a
particular nation-state and its accompanying ideology
has emerged out of feudalism or out of colonialism (or
both at once, as seems to be the case with some of the
post-1989 East European nationalisms). The former
societies tend to be better integrated, socially and
culturally, than the latter.
Fourthly, specific political traditions or histories
influence the nature of inter-ethnic relations. The
history of slavery contributes to shaping the
contemporary relationship between blacks and the US
nation-state and seems to prevent constructive dialogue.
On the other hand, the moderate success of independent
Zimbabwe as regards ethnic relations shows that there is
nothing inevitable in this kind of historical process.
Fifthly, and perhaps most fundamentally, the actual
division of political and economic power (and thereby,
the division of discursive power) constitutes, in an
important sense, the social structure of a society. In a
word, groups which are oppressed, poor and stigmatized
have little opportunity to articulate their claims
convincingly. The remarkable success of North American
Jews in retaining their ethnic identity, governing their
own destiny and yet being recognized as good Americans,
a striking success compared with other immigrant groups,
has been possible only because their economic power has
been considerable.
In sum, if violence or other serious conflicts between
nation-state and ethnicity are to be avoided, then the
state must reduce its demands as regards the degree of
cultural integration of its citizens. Since it is
virtually second nature of modern, bureaucratic states
(unlike earlier, pre-nationalist states) to promote
cultural integration at any cost, this is extremely
difficult to achieve. It remains an indubitable fact,
nevertheless, that the responsibility lies largely with
the state so long as it insists on retaining its
monopolies of political power and the use of legitimate
violence.
NOTES
Acknowledgements. Several persons have read and
commented on an earlier version of the article. Hⁿlya
Demirdirek provided stimulating criticism and comments
on both substantial and theoretical issues. Iver B.
Neumann contributed many valuable insights and
suggestions from the field of International Relations.
Georg Henriksen and Jo Helle-Valle raised important
issues concerning the treatment of nationalism and
ethnicity. Nils-Petter Gleditsch suggested several
improvements of both form and content. Last but not
least; thanks to Harald Eidheim's suggestions, the
exposition has been considerably clarified -
particularly in the section dealing with the Saami. The
ongoing research project on ideologies in Trinidad and
Mauritius has been funded by a grant and a subsequent
fellowship from the Norwegian Research Council for the
Sciences and the Humanities (NAVF).
1Relationships of coercion and integration between and
within states are not, of course, necessarily
constituted on the principles of the sovereignty of the
state. When, in 1968, the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia
and when, a decade later, the Red Army invaded
Afghanistan, the limits of the relevant polity were
drawn outside of national boundaries. Conversely, to the
extent that the USSR failed to use violence to suppress
autonomists in the Baltic republics in 1989-90, the
relevant limits of the polity were drawn inside the
state. In neither case was the state unambiguously
perceived as the relevant political unit.
2A good, topically relevant demonstration of this dual
character of ideology, is Kapferer's (1988) analysis of
the nationalisms of Sri Lanka and Australia.
3This does not mean that ethnicity can be reduced
meaningfully to politics. I have argued earlier
(Eriksen, 1988) that ethnic identity and ethnic
organization are both irreducible aspects of the
phenomenon.
4Whatever their "objective content", cultural
differences are important as long as they make a
difference to the people involved. In a given situation,
the communicated cultural differences between say,
Kikuyu and Kamba in Kenya (who are linguistically close)
may be more important than those obtaining between
Kikuyu and Luo (who are linguistically distant).
5The Zimbabwean example brings out some of the
ambiguities of the matter: To the whites, who lost the
civil war, Zimbabwean nationalism presented itself as a
relevant option to be endorsed or rejected. Many failed
to make up their mind unambiguously, and tend to
oscillate situationally between Zimbabwean nationalist
and Rhodesian supremacist ideologies.
6My use of ethnic as noun is inspired by the French word
ethnie, which is semantically wider than the term
"ethnic group", which connotes tight group integration.
7Trinidad & Tobago became intependent from Britain in
1962, Mauritius in 1968. Both are members of the
Commonwealth. Research in Mauritius and Trinidad was
carried out, respectively, in 1986 and 1989.
8This is dealt with more fully in Eriksen, 1988, pp.
166-213. The issue of language is discussed in
Eriksen,1990.
9See Ardener (1989, pp. 129-30) on dominant and "muted"
groups with particular reference to gender.
10The attempted coup d'etat in Trinidad in July, 1990,
was not ethnically motivated. Although known as "Black
Muslims", apparently an ethnic label, the rebels were a
tiny group of politically frustrated radicals with
little initial popular support. It is possible that the
looting and burning taking place in Port of Spain for a
few days during the drama did have an ethnic aspect in
the targeting of wealthy Syrians, but this was no marked
feature of the riots.
11The South African situation further exemplifies the
connection between industrialism and nationalism:
Business interests in South Africa favour universal
nationalism because it will integrate a larger number of
people into the economic system, while other whites
continue to support the non-nationalist apartheid
system.
12The related, but different ideology of federalism, is
not considered here. It may provide solutions to some of
the problems discussed. This also applies to the
"consociational" state model discussed and advocated by
Lijphart (1977). Forms of conflict not considered here
are those emerging from "irridenta nationalism" (the
most famous example of which is probably that of Alto
Adige/Sⁿd-Tirol in North-Eastern Italy), and forms of
national integration not considered include diaspora
nationalisms, where the nation is not strictly localized
to a territory.
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